November 2023 was a month of provocation activities on the Korean Peninsula and when there is activity on the peninsula it is usually not a good sign. In late November, North Korea launched a spy satellite atop of what can be considered an ICBM. As a response, South Korea suspended parts an agreement between the two countries signed in 2018 to reduce tensions between the two nations. North Korea as a counter response nullified the entire agreement and started taking up previously abandoned observation posts on the Demilitarized Zone (the DMZ). The recent events are not the direst situation experienced on the peninsula, North Korea often “acts out” for whatever reasons for attention, but the week’s events saw the return of the debate of South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons.
The reason why the argument for South Korean nuclear development is due to several factors. The launch of the first North Korean spy satellite is concerning less in what the spy satellite will provide North Korean intelligence (it is not even clear if the satellite is working) but the circumstances around the launch. The South Koreans launched their own spy satellite aboard a Space X Falcon 9 rocket from Vandenberg Space Force Base in California, so the nature of the satellite is not what is driving the nuclear debate in South Korea. The reason is that North Korea recently entered into an agreement to provide Russia with short range rockets and artillery shells for its war in Ukraine in exchange for military technology transfers. The South Korean concern is that North Korea have already received assistance from the Russians to successfully orbit the satellite.
The reason why a satellite launch is escalatory is that it is presumed that if a country can put a satellite in orbit it has an ICBM capable rocket. This does not mean that the North Koreans have the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon because it still needs to perfect miniaturization of nuclear warheads, create a re-entry vehicle and guidance to create a nuclear delivery system on a missile. There is no indication that North Korea has reached this level of expertise, but the agreement with Russia for technology transfers has created concern that the Russians could provide these technologies. The ability to miniaturize nuclear warheads and mounting them on missiles would also give North Korea to ability to mount them on their more numerous short and medium range missiles. This is a very concerning threat to South Korea and its capital Seoul which is close to the DMZ.
The South Korea, U.S. and Japan have entered into a missile warning alert agreement and the countries are cooperating on anti-ballistic missile defenses as defensive measures. However, South Korea wants more of a deterrence against the North Korean short and medium range missiles. The U.S. removed all its nuclear weapons from South Korean in the 1990s, and there is now debate to request the U.S. to re-introduce nuclear weapons to the peninsula. Advocates for a South Korean nuclear program are not satisfied with this step though.
The proponents for the South Korean nuclear program state their skepticism of the reliability of the U.S. to risk a nuclear war on behalf of South Korea in response to a North Korean escalation to a nuclear provocation. This is the same criticism that European countries and specifically Germany had about the U.S. during the Cold War and the Soviet threat. Considering the U.S. commitments to agreements with its allies, the South Korean concern is not unjustified. One can look at the Vietnam War (which South Korea participated), Budapest Memorandum (for Ukraine security), Iraq, and Afghanistan as some examples of broken agreements and security guarantees.
A South Korean nuclear program would also give its own inherent deterrence against China and North Korea. One factor that is in favor of this line of thinking is that nuclear armed states do not get attacked by other nation states. Nearly all nuclear armed states have been attacked by terrorists but not by nations. The North Koreans often do not act rationally, but China does, and a nuclear armed South Korea would be a deterrent to not to threaten the existence of South Korea for fear of being subject to a nuclear response.
South Korea becoming nuclear armed does have risk. It would upset the world order regarding the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty. When India resumed nuclear testing, it was subjected to condemnation and sanctions from around the world. This would most likely happen in response to South Korea as well, with China and North Korea, its primary antagonists creating the most protests of such a move. There is also a risk that it could cause the U.S. to re-assess its defense arrangement with South Korea including up to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. This would allow China and North Korea to threaten South Korea without concern that threatened actions would risk killing Americans.
The chance of the U.S. completely re-arranging its defense arrangements are unlikely. South Korea is an integral part of missile defense in the Pacific, and it provides a base to provide anti-missile radars and missile detection equipment to not only monitor North Korea, but also can be used to monitor deep into China. Also, U.S. presence in South Korea will allow the U.S. to continue to influence military posturing and response to aggression in the peninsula.
The other factor, outside of the manufacturing might of South Korea, it, since the start of the Russian – Ukraine War, has become a new provider of sophisticated weapons and ammunition to NATO countries as they start re-arming in response to the new Russian threat. The U.S. does not have the excess capacity to fill what would be lost by a weapons boycott of South Korea. The fact that South Korea is a valuable and an integral part for both U.S. – Pacific/Asian strategy and an arms provider to NATO most likely means that any Western or U.S. sanctions and condemnation will be short lived (or lip service only).
A South Korean nuclear weapons program does have risk, just as increasing the number of nuclear states is a risk of a nuclear weapon being used, but from the South Korean perspective there is more upside than downside. It would create debate within Japan to also develop its own nuclear weapons, which has both upside and downside as well, which would further counter balance North Korea and China. However, since nuclear armed states typically do not get attacked, it would most likely force a change to the strategic approach of China and its aggressive policy towards countries in the South China Sea, as well territorial claims against Japan. North Korea is a wildcard, and if China wants to prevent nuclear proliferation and keep its current strategic posture, it needs to reign in North Korea or otherwise accept the potential of a new strategic situation in Asia.
References:
https://www.38north.org/2023/10/south-korea-as-a-nuclear-state-trade-offs-and-choices/
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/12/04/2003810092