“Another Incident in the Second Thomas Shoal”
“China and the Philippines emerging strategies”
The People’s Republic of China and the Philippines once again had a clash in the Second Thomas Shoal on Saturday (March 23, 2024). The Chinese Coast Guard, for the second time in a month, deployed water cannons against Philippine vessels attempting to resupply the Filipino marines on the Sierra Madre (a Filipino naval vessel) and again damaging Filipino resupply vessels and causing minor injuries. Despite having another clash, the Philippines and China are not backing down in the these relatively minor skirmishes, but the rhetoric and accusations are increasing between the two countries. In addition, China has been willing to ratchet up the threat of the use of force, but so far is unable to deter the Philippines as both countries strategies are evolving.
The Philippines’ government has decided to not back down from operating and patrolling in its Exclusive Economic Zone, EEZ, despite Chinese protests and physical attempts to stop the Philippines’ actions. The Philippines is taking two distinct tracks to pressure China. The first track is that the Philippines are taking the approach that they are the victim to a much larger and aggressive adversary. This is to negatively impact China’s reputation in world opinion, which is important to China in its claims, especially when the Chinese have already lost to the Philippines in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 2013 and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016. The result of these rulings is that Chinese have lost international legitimacy in their South China Sea claims of their Nine Dash Line in much of the world.
The Philippines’ public campaign track further erodes China’s reputation and this the legitimacy of its claims. Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro, after the latest weekend incident called on China to once again to present their case to the arbitration court if it believes its claims in the South China Sea are so strong. The Philippines having won before against China it believes that China will lose once again, and this is a legitimate strategy to shame and embarrass the Chinese on the world stage.
The other track that the Philippines is taking falls back on its defense treaty with the United States to leverage against China. An armed clash in the Philippine EEZ would trigger provisions of the defense treaty and obligate the U.S. to assist in the defense of the Philippines. The Philippines has also strengthened ties in the region holding military exercises with regional countries including the U.S., Japan, Vietnam, and Australia to demonstrate resolve against China’s claim. The strategy appears to be using these alliances to warn China that an armed clash with the Philippines would lead to a wider war with other regional powers who also reject China’s claims over the South China Sea.
The Philippines mitigates their risk of a wider conflict because geographically its shores lie just outside of the First Island Chain. This means so it would be difficult for China to use most of its air force or effectively project naval power against the Philippines without using its nascent aircraft carrier fleet that would be threatened by land-based aircraft in the Philippines and other islands in the area as well as an experienced U.S. Navy aircraft carrier fleet and submarines. China is aware of this military shortcoming, so pursuing an armed clash that would highlight its weakness. This would negatively impact how the world views Chinese crafted reputation of being a military power in the eyes of an international community who largely reject or are silent on the Chinese claims in the South China Sea.
Despite the military option limitation, China’s leadership does not want to look weak either. The foreign ministry is aggressively reinforcing their claim in the South China Sea and have warned the Philippines that their relationship is at a “crossroads” and that the Philippines need to “proceed with caution” and to be aware of China’s concerns over its claims but this is largely bluster. The fact is that China will not return to arbitration because it has lost multiple times. China as well cannot project force as an effective deterrent if the Philippines ends up crossing a line and risk starting a naval war with the Philippines and the United States. A war that would also be largely in an area outside of protection of mainland Chinese land-based aircraft. The Philippines, prior to the seizing of Taiwan, is the wrong war for China to fight, and most of the world knows it.
However, the Chinese Communist leaders do not wish to lose face or release their claims, so they are more and more relying on unconventional measures to keep pressure on the Philippines and the South China Sea to keep its claims active but not risk an armed clash. For over a decade the Chinese have fortified reefs in the South China Sea by building bases and airstrips to operate to help cover the gap in force projecting into the South China Sea and the boundaries of the Nine Dash Line. However, the most active component in the sea has been the use of the Chinese Coast Guard, which is outside of the People’s Liberation Army Navy and is more of an internationally recognized law enforcement arm than a military force. The Chinese Coast Guard is being used to push the Chinese legal claims on the ocean without the escalation of heavily armed naval vessels.
The other component that does not get a lot of attention in the media, since the West and Western aligned countries do not have similar capabilities, is that of the Chinese maritime militias. These ostensibly civilian boats act in the “grey area” of maritime activities and in the case of China, escalations. They are not naval or coast guard vessels and thus in theory operate outside of government control, thus giving their activities a plausible deniability to China. This is deceiving though since these ships are there to serve the Chinese communist party interests and extend their presence in areas outside of the navy and coast guard. They also can support Chinese naval and coast guard operations as an auxiliary, and since they are not officially part of the navy or coast guard, the opposing military rules of engagement often do not account for these auxiliaries.
This China maritime auxiliary is present in the Second Thomas Shoal during the incidences with the Philippines and play a role of using their numbers to assist in interdicting Philippine supply missions by blocking the path of the Philippine supply ships and maneuver as the Philippines attempt to move around them and using these maneuvers to allow the Chinese Coast Guard close in on the Philippine vessels to ram or use their water cannons. The maritime militia have also laid water barriers around the lagoon of the Second Thomas Shoal to further block the resupply attempts. This use of the maritime militia is basically government directed mob justice in the shoals. If the Philippines use force against the militia, it will create a situation that China will accuse Philippines threatening the lives of Chinese “fisherman” and civilians. This would serve the Chinese cause in some corners of world opinion.
The Philippines relies on a policy to protect its EEZ claims by attempting to embarrass and shame the Chinese and press their position. They do this knowing that its defense alliances will protect it from a China that does not have the ability to effectively project force outside of the First Island Chain. This is especially true for China if it had to fight the U.S. Navy outside of mainland air cover. The Chinese uses their coast guard, but they also know they have limits on how far they can press. An effective option for China is to fall back to Communist philosophy of using irregular forces to operate in the grey zones of military and civilian engagement. These auxiliary forces can press the Chinese cause and be effective in serving the Chinese interest with a lower risk of starting a conflict and supplement coast guard resources. Dealing effectively with these maritime militias without turning world opinion to favor the Chinese will be the challenge for the Philippine’s and its allies.
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References:
https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/
https://www.yahoo.com/news/philippines-defence-minister-dares-china-024651224.html
https://www.newsweek.com/china-accused-attacking-us-ally-philippines-south-china-sea-1882893