“German Chancellor Scholz Provides Perspective Without Introspection”
“Scholz writes an essay on his opinions on current European security issues”
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz released a guest essay in “The Economist” magazine on May 23, 2024. The essay was mainly a discussion about the war in Ukraine, European security, and Germany’s commitment to a more secure Europe. Chancellor Scholz also expressed his opinion about Russian President Vladimir Putin and his vision for a new version of an imperialist-style Russia. Outside of President Putin's criticism, his words were both measured and diplomatic, providing insight into his vision of Europe moving forward. However, the essay lacked candor regarding the erosion of European security due to the Ukraine invasion, as well as Germany's role in creating the current European status. Scholz was not in power during the implementation of most of the contributing policies, but he did not accept responsibility for Germany's role in creating the current situation or the challenges required to correct it.
Scholz argues that Germany and its Western allies had adhered to a few rules and were able to avoid a war in Europe from the end of World War II until the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Borders are never again changed by force.
The sovereignty of all states must be respected.
No country should live in fear of its neighbors again.
He stated that Putin's imperialist desires, manifested in his invasion of Ukraine, had violated all of these rules. Scholz does ignore the Yugoslav Wars, the Chechen Civil War, the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, and the Ukraine invasion of 2014. It is true that three of the four involved Russia, so Russia's imperialist goals are valid points for supporting the Chancellor, but the Yugoslav Wars did not involve Russia, negating his points. However, examining the Franco-Prussian War, World War I, and World War II, which spanned borders not seen since World War II, generally confirms his correctness.
The Ukraine War can also be argued to not be any different from the examples of post-World War II wars in Europe, apart from length, scale, and Western reaction. The Ukraine War, classified as a dual state or civil war, has largely avoided cross-border confrontations, with the exception of missiles passing through Polish airspace or erroneously landing in Polish territory. The difference in the current Ukraine War lies in the response from the West, which experienced a mini-Neville Chamberlain moment of September 1, 1939, when it became clear to the world that appeasement only made the aggressor bolder. Despite Russia's aggressive acts in the 2000s, no serious challenge emerged against it.
Despite the imperialist acts of Russia, which we won’t examine in this article, the West, especially Germany, being the largest economy in Europe, and the European Union did nothing to seriously deter Russia’s designs on what can be argued to re-establish the Soviet Union's stature. One could argue that Russia's boldness stemmed from the German governments' post-Cold War ostrich-like behavior and over reliance on soft power.
Following the Cold War, Germany faced the cost of merging with the erstwhile German Democratic Republic, East Germany, and swiftly lowered its defense budget due to the absence of the Soviet military threat, necessitating the use of the "peace dividend" to finance the union. At the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr had nearly 500,000 members of the armed forces and 170,000 civilian personnel. This was rapidly reduced to about 180,000 members today and about 80,000 civilian personnel. While it's true that the Cold War numbers were no longer necessary, the execution of the reduction in the Bundeswehr's size was extraordinarily reckless.
Not only did they reduce the number of personnel, but they also starved the military of equipment and spare parts, causing its combat readiness to fall well short of what a military of its size or a country like Germany should have. The German approach was irresponsible and stands in stark contrast to the post-Cold War strategies adopted by France and the United Kingdom, which involved a reduction in size but also emphasized the need for a certain level of combat effectiveness for countries of their size. Germany adopted an approach that relied on NATO, particularly the United States, to provide its security, which ultimately led to a negative impact on European deterrence, as other countries had to fill the gaps in their security requirements.
Though not admitted, Chancellor Scholz boasts to the point that Germany will permanently deploy one full brigade to Lithuania for its defense against a potential Russian threat to the Baltics, which is the new flashpoint of a NATO-Russian conflict. Scholz also stated that Germany will provide one division with a higher readiness status to contribute to NATO. The Bundeswehr has a structure of seven divisions, so only one division plus a brigade will be ready to conduct combat operations. Germany has not provided any significant contribution to European or NATO deterrence against recognized Russian threats.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, which resulted in the seizure of Crimea and parts of the Donbas, Germany and its NATO partners agreed that all member countries should contribute 2% or more of their GDP to defense spending. Despite this agreement, Germany never increased defense spending to the agreed target. Russia's deterrence or NATO agreements were still not enough to push Germany to improve its readiness.
Chancellor Scholz should be credited with trying to improve Germany’s position within NATO and Europe, but it took another invasion of Ukraine to do that. Germany has committed to the 2% GDP goal and created a special fund of 100 billion euros to “jumpstart” procurement to improve the readiness and effectiveness of the Bundeswehr. The Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, Boris Pistorius, has stated that Germany has reached the 2% target and foresees the need for GDP spending to increase as high as 3.5% before the end of the 2020s. For context, prior to the war in Ukraine, German defense spending was about 1.3% of GDP. Germany is taking the right steps to improve the Bundeswehr and enhance its contribution to deterrence and European defense.
Despite this, numerous obstacles stand in the way of improving the long-neglected German armed forces. The 100 billion euros in special funds has been criticized as being too slow to be used to help improve the situation. Germany initially opted out of the F-35 Lighting II program but has now used 30 billion euros of the fund to purchase 35 new stealth aircraft, as well as all the support structures needed for the aircraft and some U.S.-made heavy lift helicopters. It takes time to produce the new aircraft, and because of Germany’s late entry into the program, it will not get its first delivery of the new fighter until 2029. Germany has been spending the remaining funds more slowly in response to critics, focusing more on domestic defense manufacturing.
The other issue with the fund is that its nominal value of 100 billion euros is misleading, as Germany is paying 8% interest on it, and the fund is experiencing erosion due to annual inflation. When Germany starts procuring its defense needs from domestic sources, it will also have to pay the value-added tax, VAT, which is currently 19%. All of these factors are expected to reduce the fund in real terms to as little as 50 to 60 billion euros over the fund's term. Based on these estimates, well over two-thirds have already been spent or earmarked. However, it will take time for the situation for the Bundeswehr to improve, as stated by Chancellor Scholz, who stated that only one division is expected to be held in higher readiness.
Germany has also donated over 30 billion euros of defense equipment to Ukraine to help it fight the Russian invasion. This represents about 18% of the German defense budget since the start of the Ukraine War. While one could argue that arming Ukraine contributes to European defense, it also hinders the Bundeswehr's ability to enhance its combat readiness by transferring equipment from Bundeswehr stocks to the east.
The other issue that Chancellor Scholz did not address is how Germany not only did not provide a credible deterrent by allowing the Bundeswehr to fall into a state of disrepair, but also how it enabled Russia. Germany's dedication to "green energy" and its response to the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011 led to the closure of all German nuclear reactors, leaving only 3 out of the 17 operational in 2011.
Germany still had energy needs that could not be filled by its own green initiatives, and the loss of nuclear power had to be made up. As a result, then-former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, who became the chairman of the shareholder committee for the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, supported and promoted pipelines that allowed Germany to purchase 55% of its gas from Russia. One could also argue that Germany outsourced a significant portion of its energy needs to Russia, giving the impression of being more environmentally conscious than it actually was. Russia, arguably less environmentally responsible than Germany, likely contributed to a net negative environmental impact.
The overall point is that Germany was not only spending money to purchase Russian energy, but it was also ready to expand it through the now-defunct Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Despite Germany's lack of military deterrence against Russian aggression, it was actively funding Russia and enabling it to pursue its imperialist goals. The German government continued its course even after the 2014 invasion.
Chancellor Scholz was not the elected leader of Germany when many of these pre-Ukraine war decisions were made, as he was elected as the Chancellor three months prior to the war in Ukraine. However, he did not become a proponent of improving German energy dependence on Russia, nor did he promote increasing defense spending to improve the Bundeswehr; none of that occurred until after the Russian invasion. We cannot hold him accountable for the circumstances where German defense complacency and negligence virtually eliminated Germany's deterrence, its reliance on Russian energy, and the benefits it brought to the Putin administration. His forward vision of his essay is largely correct from a European perspective, but his lack of introspection about how Germany got itself into this position is concerning, to say the least.
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References:
https://amp.dw.com/en/what-happened-to-the-german-militarys-100-billion-fund/a-64846571