How Can Russia Help North Korea’s Nuclear Program?
A rare public glimpse inside an enrichment facility
The official newspaper for the “Worker's Party of Korea in North Korea” reported that on September 13, 2024, the North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un visited a nuclear production facility. Where the facility was located is unknown, but it was likely in the southeast. The newspaper reported that Mr. Kim was present to inspect the facility and provide "on-site guidance." The contemplative thoughts of the stumpy, waddling dictator undoubtedly enlightened the staff of technicians and physicists. Despite the absurdity of watching Mr. Kim struggle through a walking tour in an attempt to look impressive, the newspaper's decision to allow photos from inside the facility was a message to the world. North Korea has made significant investments to enhance its nuclear enrichment facilities, and the publication of these photos serves to reaffirm their dedication to nuclear power and provides insight into their journey.
North Korea has recently signed a mutual defense treaty with Russia as the cooperation between the two countries has deepened since the start of the Ukraine War. It is a mutually beneficial arrangement between the two countries. North Korea has provided Russia with an estimated one thousand missiles, five million artillery shells, at least two army engineering brigades for the Donbas, and recently the escalatory decision of sending of 12,000 combat troops to the Russian-contested Kursk region.
Reports, though not confirmed, suggest that North Korea receives hard currency, energy and food aid, political support at the U.N., and, of greater concern, military knowledge and technology assistance in return. South Korea has suspected that this knowledge sharing led to the successful launch and orbit of North Korea’s first reconnaissance satellite in November 2023. The Russians also benefited by the destabilization of the Korean Peninsula, which occurred as a purposeful response to Western-aligned countries supporting Ukraine and disregarding Russia's "red lines." Despite all this aid and assistance, the pictures from the facility show no sign of Russian support of the North Korean nuclear program.
This assessment, potentially part of a propaganda effort to shape the narrative, is based on pictures from the tour, which show the enrichment facility and the rows of centrifuges required to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. The centrifuges were the focal point of the tour and the primary reason for the release of the pictures. Centrifuges are used to separate natural uranium ore, which is predominantly comprised of non-fissionable uranium-238 but has a small portion, about 0.7%, of the fissionable uranium-235. Centrifuges are used to separate the heavier elements from the lighter elements so that uranium-235 can be harvested at 90% concentrated levels for weapons-grade levels needed for nuclear weapons.
To separate the heavy uranium elements, the centrifuges used for this separation must spin at supersonic speeds. This requires advanced manufacturing techniques to create centrifuges that can spin at these speeds and maintain balance. Only three companies can manufacture centrifuges that can withstand the stress of uranium separation. The companies are the following:
• URENCO - British-German-Dutch
• Rosatom - Russia
• Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited - Japan
The pictures reveal that none of these companies' centrifuges are present in the North Korean facility, and it is widely acknowledged that North Korea lacks the precision manufacturing capabilities necessary to produce enrichment centrifuges. The centrifuges' size suggests that Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani, acquired them from the "nuclear black market" to illicitly sell Pakistani centrifuge technology. Dr. Khan, who previously worked for URENCO, stole the centrifuge technology from this company for Pakistan's nuclear program and subsequently allowed its proliferation. Estimates indicate that the facility in the picture supports an annual enrichment of 220 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium, sufficient for 10 nuclear warheads.
The pictures confirm that North Korea is indeed scaling up its enrichment production and is doing so without Russian technology. However, the enrichment of uranium is not the primary area requiring Russian support. The Uranium-238 can also be used for the creation of Plutonium-240. Where a uranium-235 nuclear bomb needs about 22 kilograms, a plutonium-240 bomb only needs 3.5 kilograms for the same yield. The design of uranium-235 nuclear bombs is simpler, as it only requires a ballistic collision of two uranium spheres to initiate a fission chain reaction, resulting in a nuclear explosion. The trade-off is that a uranium-based nuclear bomb is significantly heavier and does not lend itself to miniaturization, a crucial factor in the development of nuclear bombs with higher explosive yields. Miniaturization is required to mount a nuclear weapon to a ballistic missile.
Plutonium-240 nuclear weapons are more difficult to produce than uranium-235-based weapons, as a plutonium bomb requires a conventional explosive to create quick and uniform compression of the core to reach supercritical fission that is not needed for uranium-235 bombs. North Korea is grappling with the challenge of developing an explosive device capable of producing the necessary force and uniformity to transform their nuclear weapons into warheads suitable for missile mounting. The North Koreans do not require Russian expertise or centrifuges, but they do require the know-how to develop a conventional explosive capable of compressing a plutonium core. North Korea could also benefit from assistance with ballistic missile warhead re-entry and guidance, as these are additional areas where they could benefit from support.
Although the public is unaware of the extent and nature of Russia's support for North Korea, at least one facility seems to confirm that North Korea is neither receiving nor needing Russian assistance for uranium enrichment. Uranium bombs are not ideal for miniaturizing ballistic missiles using higher-yield nuclear warheads.
Beyond its missile program, Russia could assist North Korea in developing advanced conventional explosive technology, not plutonium production, to achieve an efficient and equal implosion on a plutonium core. North Korea is not in the position to help Russia out of the “goodness of its heart,” and Russia, tied into a resource-consuming war, is not in the position to send many advanced weapons to North Korea. Russia has depleted its foreign currency reserves, limiting its financial aid in hard currency to North Korea. Russia can provide food and energy aid, but its main contribution to the Hermit Kingdom is the technology and knowledge sharing it needs to advance its weapons programs. It is also the step that Russia can take to create international tensions and destabilization in response to Western decisions to cross red lines.
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Reference:
https://www.spf.org/spf-china-observer/en/eisei/eisei-detail011.html
https://www.csis.org/analysis/seoul-moscow-relations-dangerous-slippery-slope
https://www.reuters.com/world/south-koreans-remain-opposed-sending-arms-ukraine-2024-11-27/