Kim Jong Un Improves The Hermit Kingdom’s Stature: That Aint Good
Nuclear weapons becoming central to Pyongyang’s strategies
The Korean Peninsula has experienced significant drama over the past year, and that is noteworthy for a region that has been embroiled in conflict since June 1950. While not solely responsible, the Ukraine War has elevated both Koreas in the international arena, as Russia and the West have sought support from their respective Korean allies. It is a curious twist that the two Koreas, aligned with the major military powers of China and the U.S., both of which maintain a substantial presence in a landscape that appears to be heading toward conflict, are now focusing their attention on Europe as Russia and the West vie for an advantage in the Ukraine War. Despite this international tension and intrigue, the overall power dynamics on the Korean Peninsula seem to favor North Korea, as its nuclear program has resurfaced in discussions, often for less than favorable reasons.
The international drama surrounding the Korean Peninsula has seen North Korea actively participate in the Ukraine War. This involvement has gone beyond simply providing army civil engineering support, with up to two brigades operating in and around the Russian-occupied Ukrainian Donbas. North Korea's weapons trade with Russia has included millions of rounds of artillery ammunition and hundreds of missiles for its military efforts. This year, North Korea has deployed as many as 13,000 combat troops to the Russian Kursk region to join the counteroffensive against Ukraine, contributing to the eventual recapture of the region.
South Korea has reported that North Korea has suffered up to 4,700 casualties—killed, wounded, and missing—during its engagement against Ukrainian forces. This marks North Korea's first venture into foreign military intervention. Although the combat outcomes were mixed at best and disastrous at worst—resulting in the withdrawal of North Korean troops from frontline combat—the significance lies more in the international profile it has created for the Hermit Kingdom and its paunchy leader, Kim Jong Un, as well as the anticipated benefits from Russia in exchange for its support in the war.
South Korea, not wanting to be left out, has signed weapons agreements with NATO European countries, particularly developing close ties with Poland. These agreements will include the sale of South Korean main battle tanks and MLRS artillery systems to Poland, as well as provisions for South Korean tanks to be manufactured in Poland under license.
The anticipated increase in defense spending among NATO and European Union countries is expected to drive up demand for South Korean technology and weapons. However, South Korea faces constitutional limitations on providing weapons to active combatants, which means its support for Ukraine has been less direct. Instead, South Korea plays a high-profile role in the deterrent buildup of military forces in Europe, a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This involvement includes South Korea’s active participation in NATO as a partner country, which entails attending numerous NATO summits, including the upcoming leaders’ summit in The Hague this month.
Unlike North Korea, which has experienced a streak of international success—a relative statement for a recognized pariah nation—South Korea has faced public setbacks. Its previous president declared martial law in December 2024 against "North Korean communist forces" and "anti-state forces." However, this decree was short-lived, and then-President Yoon Suk Yeol was ousted from office by the Constitutional Court. New elections were subsequently held, and on June 4th, Lee Jae-myung was elected as the new president of the nation. This change in leadership lowered South Korea's international profile just as North Korea became more active in combat in Kursk, while the South Korean government focused inward to address the crisis.
The new South Korean President, Lee Jae-myung, is considered a center-left politician by Western standards, and one of his first actions has been to seek rapprochement with North Korea, reversing many of the hardline policies of former President Yoon Suk Yeol. South Korea took the initial step by unilaterally ending the use of loudspeakers to send propaganda and K-Pop toward North Korea, and this gesture appears to be reciprocated by North Korea.
North Korea has faced challenges on the international stage, notably when it botched the launch of one of its newest destroyers. This vessel, promoted as a domestic design, actually appeared to be a Frankenstein mashup based on a Russian destroyer plan and combined elements of Chinese, Russian, and North Korean technology. The launch of the second destroyer resulted in the ship being left half-sunk and laying on its side, and the embarrassment, to the horror of some hapless officials responsible for the launch, was heightened and made worse by Kim Jong Un's presence at the event.
Despite this setback, it seems that actions taken by Mr. Kim have positioned North Korea for military ascendance, particularly as North Korea is believed to be receiving military technology assistance from Russia in exchange for its diplomatic and military support during Russia's ongoing conflict. Meanwhile, the new South Korean president has publicly aimed to re-establish dialogue with North Korea and is taking unilateral steps toward that goal. However, in the realm of international politics, it appears that South Korea has blinked, which North Korea likely recognizes, and given past behavior, it may make humiliating demands of South Korea as it tries to reproachment with the North.
It is unclear what demands North Korea may make, but it has clearly stated that its nuclear program is off-limits to any negotiations with South Korea or the United States. This stance includes a rejection of the possibility of initiating a new dialogue with the U.S. There are several reasons for North Korea's refusal to negotiate on its nuclear program. Countries rarely initiate wars against nuclear-armed adversaries; however, this was not entirely the case for India and Pakistan, both of which engaged in brief military operations against each other despite both being nuclear powers. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons provide a guarantee of a state's survival by posing the threat of countervalue targeting against an aggressor's population centers through nuclear attacks. For North Korea, these weapons serve as a guarantee of its survival against the U.S., South Korea, and Japan.
Photo from U.S. Army (open source)
North Korea has a fragile economy and agricultural sector, and its nuclear weapons can also be used as a means to secure international aid. This is due to international diplomacy's preference for stability, especially with nuclear-armed countries, over other considerations. North Korea understands that it can leverage its nuclear arsenal to obtain more international aid during internal crises to ensure its survival. Some may consider this assertion exaggerated, but North Korea has never been denied international aid, which has played a significant role in preserving the country's dynastic power.
The existence of North Korea's nuclear weapons, along with its frequent jingoistic threats to use them, has lost some of its impact recently since Russian President Putin has adopted a similar approach. Nevertheless, these actions signal to the world that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and expects to receive concessions, whatever their demands maybe, in return. While there are limits to what they can obtain, the international community seems willing to assist in preserving the dynasty—not necessarily to help it thrive, but to ensure its survival in order to maintain stability and the existing status quo regarding control of nuclear weapons. This reflex to preserve order of nuclear states in international politics cannot be understated.
Militarily, nuclear weapons are becoming a central element of North Korea's strategy. In the past, North Korea relied on the threat of overwhelming firepower from its long-range artillery to target South Korean and U.S. forces, capable of firing up to one million artillery rounds into Seoul, the South Korean capital, which lies within range of North Korean long range artillery. Recently, North Korea has sent large stockpiles of its artillery shells—an essential component of its previous military strategy—without any public material demands from Russia. However, the transfer of artillery shells and systems to Ukraine appears to compromise North Korea's military position.
This scenario raises the possibility that North Korea is shifting from conventional military forces to a greater reliance on nuclear capabilities delivered through its extensive missile program. Holding Seoul hostage with a million artillery shells may become less necessary if a few dozen nuclear-armed tactical missiles can achieve a more devastating effect.
To strengthen its nuclear capabilities, North Korea needs to miniaturize its warheads for its missiles and develop re-entry vehicles, particularly for its longer-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and potential submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). While North Korea will eventually overcome these challenges independently, Russia could provide valuable assistance in this area to speed up the development curve.
By compromising its most significant conventional deterrent to support Russia, North Korea likely expects something in return to help re-establish that deterrent. Although Russia revived the prior Soviet-era mutual defense treaty with North Korea in June 2024, the absence of a significant Russian presence in the Far East diminishes its deterrent effect, especially since Russia is up to its neck in Ukraine and requires military assistance from North Korea. A practical solution would be for North Korea to obtain technical support from Russia to enhance the integration of its rocket and nuclear forces, making this combination the cornerstone of North Korea's military and political strategy.
The United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a report suggesting that North Korea is constructing a new uranium enrichment site located about 1.5 miles (2.3 kilometers) from an existing enrichment plant. The IAEA suspects, but cannot confirm, that this site is intended for uranium enrichment, as it matches the dimensions of a confirmed enrichment facility.
This aligns with public statements made by Kim Jong Un regarding the expansion of the country’s nuclear arsenal and its enrichment capabilities. Since the addition of an Experimental Light Water Reactor in October 2023, there have been no reports of new advancements in plutonium enrichment capabilities since that date. This reactor is projected to produce approximately 6 kilograms of plutonium annually, sufficient for one bomb per year. In contrast, North Korea can produce 200 kilograms of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), enough for 5 to 10 warheads each year.
North Korea seems to be increasingly reliant on uranium enrichment rather than plutonium enrichment. This may be due to the challenges of constructing additional nuclear reactors capable of generating higher levels of plutonium, which could exceed current capabilities and necessitate more external assistance. It remains uncertain whether Russia or China would be willing to support North Korea in building a reactor for plutonium production, as this could be perceived as overly escalatory to most of the worlds. However, the advantage for North Korea is that it requires minimal outside assistance, aside from the centrifuges needed to produce HEU. Although uranium bombs tend to be heavier and generally lower explosive yields than plutonium bombs, they can be simpler to design and produce into a more reliable nuclear warhead.
North Korea has transitioned from a state of secrecy regarding its nuclear program to a more open approach about its activities. However, it intentionally does not disclose the number of bombs it possesses, their performance, or any suspected Russian assistance, as this serves to create a deterrent effect through strategic ambiguity. The establishment of a new facility and the ongoing collaboration with Russia indicate that North Korea is committed to making nuclear weapons a central aspect of its military and diplomatic strategy.
This reality is one that the new South Korean "hat in hand" strategy of engagement, as well as pressure from the U.S. or even China, is unlikely to change. Russia appears willing to embrace and even elevate this situation, particularly under President Putin's leadership. The interconnection between nuclear weapons and the Kim dynasty is a fact that other countries must accept, from the North Korean point of view, forcing them to determine how to coexist with a bellicose, nuclear-armed North Korea. This may involve the international community either yielding to its demands to preserve its regime or adopting a policy aimed at weakening it. The options are to either "appease the appeaser" and accept the ever-increasing demands of the regime in Pyongyang or to counter with overwhelming deterrence and be prepared to confront the unpredictable nature of the North Korean leadership in an international game of chicken.
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References:
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/10/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-uranium.html