Spanish Fly

Spanish Prime Minister Rejects NATO’s Call for Increased Defense Spending

Jun 21, 2025

three flags flying in the wind on a sunny day — Photo by David Vives on Unsplash

The annual NATO leaders’ summit is scheduled for June 24th and 25th in The Hague, Netherlands. This meeting marks the first gathering for NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in his role as the political leader of NATO. It is also the first NATO leaders meeting featuring President Donald Trump during his second term. This year’s summit has been shortened by one day compared to previous meetings and has one overarching goal: to reach an agreement on increasing defense spending, a priority for both President Trump and Secretary Rutte within the defense organization. However, this week, that goal appears to be in doubt.

President Trump, much to the consternation and anxiety of most NATO leaders, has publicly announced his intent to implement the long-delayed Asian pivot aimed at countering the increasing threats posed by China. As a result, the United States will prioritize Asia over European defense. The anxiety among NATO leaders does not primarily stem from the announcement of the Asian pivot itself, as this has been a defense policy goal since President Obama’s administration. Although European leaders did not fully embrace this shift, they grudgingly accepted it, as they were reluctant to publicly challenge the U.S. president at that time.

The current concern is that the Ukraine War persists, and NATO, despite increasing defense spending since the conflict began, has little to show for it. A significant portion of the defense budget increases is allocated to military aid for Ukraine, coupled with inflationary pressures stemming from heightened demand in defense procurement. Additionally, there are delays associated with the time it takes for budgeting, production, procurement, and deployment processes. The potential reduction of U.S. defense commitments raises alarms, particularly as Europe continues to lag in military capabilities and, consequently, in deterrence, without a robust U.S. military presence and a U.S. defense policy that prioritizes European security.

black fighter plane in sky — Photo by Richard R. Schünemann on Unsplash

The anxiety among NATO, the European Union, and their member states centers on the prospects for peace in Ukraine. While talks have largely stalled, discussions continue at lower levels with intermediaries. The most common peace deal proposed by Western nations involves Europe supplying peacekeepers to be deployed within Ukraine, with Europe acting as the guarantor of peace, independent of U.S. involvement. However, in addition to Russian opposition, there exists a significant capability gap among European nations, preventing them from providing a sufficiently large and enduring force to address Ukraine's longstanding security concerns.

NATO and its European members need to increase military defense spending for deterrence and to position European countries at the forefront of defense and peacekeeping efforts, should the need arise. Apart from Mark Rutte, French President Emmanuel Macron has frequently advocated for this, aligning with a long-term objective of France dating back to Charles de Gaulle. However, increased defense spending is not universally accepted; many NATO countries prioritize domestic spending over defense, even in light of the ongoing Ukraine War.

Charles de Gaulle

The new spending goals that Secretary Rutte is advocating this week call for NATO to increase its defense spending from 2% of GDP to 5% of GDP. This proposed increase is divided into two categories: defense-specific spending would rise to 3.5%, while 1.5% would be allocated to security-related projects that may have dual-use applications. However, this week, the Prime Minister of Spain, Pedro Sanchez, expressed his disapproval of this plan put forth by President Trump and Secretary Rutte. Mr. Sanchez stated that an increase in defense spending to 5% would be “unreasonable” and “unproductive,” and he communicated this sentiment to Secretary Rutte.

Spain has never met the 2% GDP defense spending target set by NATO in 2014. Currently, Spain ranks near the bottom in defense spending, with its defense budget amounting to only 1.28% of its GDP. Although Spain has agreed to increase its spending to 2.1% by 2029, Mr. Sanchez believes that this level of spending is sufficient for the country’s military needs. He acknowledges that other NATO countries may have different requirements and does not wish to restrict them from spending more, indicating that a flexible formula for defense spending is necessary.

The challenge for Secretary Rutte is that NATO rules stipulate that unanimous agreement is required from all member countries on nearly all decisions, including the adoption of new defense spending targets. Spain's refusal to agree to an increase based on the 3.5%/1.5% formula effectively renders the proposal dead before the NATO meeting begins, which is the main objective of this year's summit for NATO leaders. While negotiations can occur during the summit, the compressed timeline means there is little opportunity for discussions. Usually, issues are resolved prior to the summit, and the event only serves to confirm the decisions already made.

Spain's stance may undermine NATO and create a division within the alliance concerning its commitment. Spain could, of course, concur with the spending targets and then choose to overlook them, much like most NATO members did with the 2% GDP target set in 2014. Since then, only three countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Greece—have met that target. This situation raises concerns because NATO has already encountered compliance issues with the 2014 policy, and it is trying to address those problems again. Critics of the unsuccessful policy are seeking reassurance that the failures of the 2% GDP target will not happen again. Given that Spain has openly declared it will not endorse the new targets, if it later agrees after Mr. Sanchez's public comments, one can assume that adherence to the new spending targets will follow the same path as the 2% requirement: unanimous approval followed by widespread disregard.

Prime Minister Sanchez's statement that 2.1% is sufficient for Spain's military needs, while other NATO countries should determine their own spending, raises significant concerns. This suggestion mirrors NATO's spending levels prior to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine in 2014, which led to the establishment of the 2% GDP target. If adopted, this stance would imply that NATO has no mandatory spending requirements for its members and would leave its operational capacity reliant on the national policies of its 32 member states. While this approach may enhance the notion of state sovereignty over a multinational organization like NATO, it risks undermining the alliance's deterrent capabilities.

NATO, for most of its existence, relied on the individual defense policies of its member nations, and this approach seemed to work effectively. At the end of the Cold War in 1991, NATO had only 16 members, compared to the 32 it has today. Those 16 nations faced a tangible external threat from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. After the Cold War, however, defense spending declined sharply as the Soviet Union dissolved, eliminating the external threat. NATO found itself as an organization searching for a purpose. It transitioned from a defense organization to one aimed at providing stability, choosing to expand into Eastern Europe, which included former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet republics. These nations sought protection from the potential resurgence of Russia in a Soviet-style system, and in this context, NATO discovered a new mission.

The issue with NATO expansion is that the Russian threat, particularly before Putin and during the early years of his over 25-year rule in Russia, was largely nonexistent. NATO expanded without a clear external threat, and its primary apparent purpose was to offer stability against potential Russian encroachment. However, once a potential external threat emerged with President Putin's increasing ambitions, NATO had already expanded. Its coalition of 32 nations now reflects a much broader range of perspectives on security matters, especially concerning Russia, compared to the original 16 members. This diversity of views affects how each member determines its defense budgets, even after 2014. Furthermore, all 32 nations, with their differing perspectives, operate under unanimous consent rules, making it nearly impossible to agree on and implement any impactful policies.

Mr. Sanchez's perspective is accurate; a defense budget of 2.1% of GDP is sufficient for Spain. The country is only minimally involved in supporting Ukraine and has not held significant global influence since the Spanish-American War of 1898. Unlike many European NATO partners, Spain does not depend on Russia for energy; instead, it relies on solar, wind, hydroelectric, nuclear, and natural gas sources primarily from Algeria and the U.S. Russia does not pose a security threat to Spain, and the nation has chosen not to engage extensively in global affairs. Spain's position differs significantly from that of other NATO countries, such as the Baltic states that border Russia or Germany, which continues to purchase Russian energy.

It is worth questioning why Spain seeks membership in NATO; however, this is irrelevant since Spain is already a member of the organization. There is no mechanism to expel a country that does not wish to leave, due to the requirement of unanimous consent among member nations. Any member could veto a motion to remove it, even if all other nations agreed to take that action. Spain's decision has highlighted the profound division in NATO's post-Cold War expansion. With 32 nations representing diverse viewpoints, NATO risks becoming an organization with substantial military potential yet limited ability to effectively utilize that potential. If this is the case, what is the purpose of NATO?

A non-starter solution would be for NATO members to relinquish part of their sovereignty to a multinational organization like NATO, which would then dictate national defense spending and policy. Most NATO countries would likely never agree to this, and that is a sensible stance. Another alternative is for NATO to transition from a model of collective defense to one that promotes interoperability among member states by establishing common standards, planning exercises, and supervising them while still allowing member states to forge their own collective agreements within the organization.

NATO countries concerned about Russia establish their own ad hoc organization, complete with its own rules and spending requirements, to address the situation in the East. While NATO facilitates this ad hoc organization, it does not direct its activities. This includes discussions related to Article V, where the wider organization considers whether to assist its member states. Even without unanimous consent, the new NATO organization provides support to the ad hoc organization in its efforts.

This is not a perfect solution, but Spain, while not the only country hesitant to commit to the 3.5%/1.5% framework, has effectively undermined the primary purpose of the NATO leaders' summit next week. Even if Spain experiences an 11th-hour change of heart, the damage is done due to its history of non-compliance with the 2% GDP goal, a pattern shared by many other NATO countries. It will be perceived as Spain agreeing but ultimately mirroring its past behavior regarding the 2% goal—agreeing without following through. They will realize they can agree without the expectation of compliance. Prime Minister Sanchez will act as a traitor to the benefit of a significant number of NATO members, indicating that Secretary Rutte, despite all his efforts, has faced a major setback ahead of his inaugural leadership summit as NATO Secretary General. It’s time to consider a Plan B.