“The Failures Leading to the Ukraine War”

Author’s notes:  This article is about Western and U.S. diplomatic failures and Russian aggression creating conditions that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to justify the invasion Ukraine.  The West and Ukraine cannot escape their role in creating Russian justifications for the war, but it is clear there was no imminent threat to Russian security or sovereignty in February 2022 by either the West or Ukraine to justify their actions.  Ukraine is the aggrieved party due to Russian invasion, so my just criticism of U.S., European and Ukrainian leaders does not exonerate Putin for choosing war and he is ultimately responsible for the fall out of turning Ukraine policy into a hot conflict. 

“The Failures Leading to the Ukraine War”

 Introduction

     On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and ever since the Ukrainian War has influenced international diplomacy, economic and military policy in nearly every continent in the world.  The Cold War might be a distant memory to many, but the muscle memory of the Cold War has created reflexive Eastern (dominated by Russia) and Western (the U.S.- NATO alliance) suspicions of each other is still alive and well and has been simmering under the surface waiting for an event to bring the conflict to the surface.  The winter of 2022 was that event. 

     The invasion of Ukraine is an ongoing disaster and the longer the war continues it is turning a humanitarian crisis into a humanitarian disaster due to the disruption of the world food chain and economic systems.  Western economic sanctions and overt military aid with a stated goal of, at least in some countries, for regime change in Russia which has resulted in what was once considered Russian propaganda that the West and NATOs goal is to overthrow Russia into a reality.  This has allowed Russian leaders to rally its population, at least tepidly, to support the war and to use nuclear threats that have not been heard since the early 1980s or the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 

     The war was not an event created in a vacuum but has come from a series of string soft power failures and broken treaty obligations of Western, Russian and Ukrainian leaders dating back the dissolving of the Soviet Union and has polarized the world in camps not seen since the Cold War.  It also demonstrated that no agreements should be signed or guaranteed if they cannot be honored, that honoring has to be equally applied, that the impact of corruption erodes a party’s morale position.

The Budapest Memorandum

     The Ukraine went from being the “breadbasket” of the Soviet Union to an independent nation when the Soviet Union dissolved on December 26, 1991.  A result of this newfound independence was Ukraine became the third largest nuclear power in the world as it assumed control of Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its territory.  This included 176 ICBMs, 44 strategic bombers, 1,900 strategic weapons, and up to 4,000 tactical warheads. 

     Nominal control of these weapons was under the Confederation of Independent States, CIS, the successor of the Soviet Union for former Soviet Republics that did not immediately pursue independence and was dominated by the Russian Federation.  The Ukrainian government briefly pursued controlling these nuclear weapons but mainly due to economic and technical reasons it could not afford or gain control of the weapons from the CIS.  In the end a negotiated settlement was signed on December 6, 1994, called the Budapest Memorandum between Ukraine, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States to resolve the ownership of these nuclear weapons. 

     The Budapest Memorandum agreed that Ukraine would give up all nuclear weapons and would become a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, and in exchange it would receive a multiparty six-point commitment to guarantee its long-term security. 

1.        Signatories to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine’s existing borders (which included the Crimea) in accordance with OCSE’s rules outlined in the “Final Act” (the Helsinki Process). 

2.       Signatories agree to respect the territorial and political integrity of the Ukraine and would not use its weapons against it.

3.       Signatories refrain from economic coercion in accordance to OCSE guidelines. 

4.       Signatories agree to seek United Nation Security Council action if Ukraine becomes the victim of outside aggression.

5.       Signatories agree not to use nuclear weapons against NPT members unless for the purpose of self-defense.

6.       Signatories agree to consult if a situation arises regarding these security commitments.

     The memorandum was signed during economic turmoil in Russia, Ukraine and most of its former Eastern Bloc and by a West that desired to capitalize on its stronger position at the end of the Cold War and its wanting to spend its “peace dividend”.  This resulted in signatories that were too eager to tie off “loose ends” caused by the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 

     This memorandum with its high-minded goals was meant to protect Ukraine sovereignty from its fear of Russia.  The memorandum from a security perspective was not a viable long-term solution, and it committed the U.S. and U.K. to an agreement that certainly could not be enforced if a Russian government, with its common border with Ukraine, decided that it did not want to honor its terms.  The U.N. could not enforce the agreement because Russia, U.K. and the U.S. all had veto power in the U.N. Security Council, so U.N. action would have been easily blocked with just one countries veto.  France and Germany, nor the political leadership of NATO were signatories, so were free to pursue their own interests and not be bound by Ukrainian security. 

     The memorandum was good in its intentions but naïve in form and was a product of the turmoil of foreign and economic affairs caused by the end of the Cold War.  It was the first step of diplomatic failures in Ukraine and as a strange coincidence, the U.S. representative to sign the memorandum was the U.S. ambassador to Hungary, Donald Blinken, the father Antony Blinken, the U.S. Secretary of State at the start of the war. 

     The faults of the memorandum did not prevent its implementation and by 1996 all former nuclear weapons were re-deployed to Russian (or destroyed) and in 2012 all highly enriched uranium was sent to Russia.  Did this disarmament play a role in eliminating deterrence to Russian aggression in 2014 in the Ukraine?  Perhaps, but more destabilizing acts were to play out between 1994 and 2014. 

NATO Expansion

     When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, NATO’s frontier, despite unification of Germany in 1990, was still west of the old Inner German Border that split the two German states, and the line between the Eastern and Western blocs.  The reunification of Germany occurred after the agreement from former World War II Allied powers assented to it.  The Soviet Union, trying to hold its own republics together, could not afford to keep the Eastern Bloc countries from pursuing interests contrary to Soviet desires and was not in a strong position to block the re-unification.

      Russia and the Soviet Union were twice invaded by Germany in the 20^th century at the loss of 30+ million citizens.  The Soviet dictator at the end of World War II committed to creating a geographical buffer zone of politically friendly states between central Europe and the Soviet Union to prevent future invasions (simultaneously this put the Soviets in a position to militarily threaten Western Europe).  The end of the Cold War did not remove this long-held concern of the soon to be defunct Soviet Union and Russia for the need of geographical security. 

     A goal of the Soviet Union in agreeing to German reunification and the release of the Eastern Bloc was that it would no longer be seen as a threat to Europe but also expressed a desire that NATO should not expand its borders east closer to the Soviet Union.  Current Russian diplomats and leaders, including Putin, stated starting in the early 2000s that NATO gave guarantees in 1990 that it would not expand membership to former Eastern Bloc and former Soviet Republics.  NATO has denied this claim on multiple occasions stating that any agreement to that effect would have to be negotiated in writing and it was not. 

     NATO’s claims are correct in that an agreement would need to be negotiated and put into writing considering the bureaucratic tendencies of the Europeans (considering the actions of the European Union and its regulatory mindset).  Russian claims of the verbal agreement were more for international posturing to slow down NATO expansion and for domestic consumption to show Putin standing up for Russian interests against the West. 

     However, European leaders, including former Soviet republics are aware of Russian and Soviet Union trauma, especially of World War II, made a geographical buffer between Russia and potential hostile powers a permanent fixture of Russian foreign and security policy.  NATO leaders would know that expansion closer to Russian borders would be seen as a threat to Russia even if NATO had no intentions of military action against Russia.  The mere expansion had the potential for instability by creating a flashpoint. 

     Russia protested the eastward expansion of NATO but much of it happened while Russia was in disarray after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Russia still had buffer states of Belarus and Ukraine and by Finland’s desire not to antagonize Russia and to remain neutral provided some semblance of buffer states.  The small NATO member states of Estonia and Latvia were a concern, but their small size was not considered a serious threat to Russia’s security, though Russia did maintain military posture to threaten the Baltic states and made NATO hesitant to deploy more forces in these locations to avoid escalating tensions. 

     Tensions escalated in the 2000s when NATO and Ukraine started negotiations, both formal and informal, of Ukrainian membership to NATO.  Russia shares a 1,200-mile land border with Ukraine and NATO establishment into the Russian buffer zone was a serious provocation. The only security risks to NATO near Ukraine was Russia, so Russia could only interpret NATO expansion as a security threat.  Russia argued that NATO was created as a military counterbalance to Soviet Union military power.  Even if this was not NATOs intent, the Russian perception and concern is hard to ignore considering there is no other interest of NATO expansion in Ukraine other than to establish a common border with Russia and NATOs original goal was to counter the Soviet Union.

     Putin at a meeting of NATO countries in April 2008, where a proposal to Ukraine to start NATO membership was to be discussed, strenuously objected to Ukraine membership even to the point of stating that Ukraine was not even a real country.  This was most likely meant as a Russian belief that Ukraine was created as a Russian client state and not an independent entity. 

     Putin took his objections directly to President George W. Bush and ultimately Ukraine was not allowed to start the membership process.  President Bush realized that the continued wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the establishment of U.S. logistic bases in former Soviet republics to support the Afghanistan campaign meant the U.S. was not in a favorable position to antagonize Putin and dismiss his concerns without serious ramifications to the ongoing American military campaigns.   

     NATO expansion could be interpreted as a violation of the Budapest Memorandum on several points including consultation on security commitments as part of the agreement.  Though NATO was not a signatory to the Memorandum, Russia was and could see NATO expansion as violating its security, even though the Memorandum was more a security commitment for Ukraine, it could be viewed as security of all parties who signed. 

      NATO leadership also had to realize expansion served no purpose that was beneficial to NATO and its security, and it could be seen as nothing short of provocation to Russia.  NATO membership along with other issues would become part of internal politics and affairs of Ukraine which would become areas that both Russia and the West exploited to the detriment of world affairs leading to the events of February 2022. 

Ukrainian Presidential Politics

     There have been six presidents of Ukraine, and all had important roles in the relatively young country and presidential politics often reflected the social unrest in the country.  Instead of focusing on all the presidents the focus will be on the last three.  It is not that they are any more important than the first three, but they held power in a political environment that was shaped by their predecessors leading up to the Russian interventions in 2014 and 2022.

    Viktor Yanukovych was elected the fourth president of the Ukraine in February 2010 on a platform of economic alignment closer to the European Union (the EU).  Closer EU ties were a concern for Russia, but Yanukovych attempted to balance Russian concerns by running on a platform of military non-alignment.  The EU, as a political body, was not a signatory of the Budapest Memorandum, so pursuing closer EU ties, according to Yanukovych’s calculations, was not a violation of the agreement. 

     Yanukovych’s campaign was supported by two well know American political consultants; Tony Podesta and Paul Manafort.  Tony Podesta is the brother of John Podesta, both part of the Podesta Group, and John is a longtime associate of the Clinton’s and was the Hillary Clinton’s Campaign Chair for her 2016 presidential run.  Paul Manafort had a short stint as Donald Trump’s Campaign Chair during his 2016 presidential run, and both had active roles in Yanukovych’s presidential campaign.  Manafort and Podesta ran efforts for Yanukovych’s campaign with a tailored message of supporting both Russian and European interests.  This strategy was not unusual since there were factions in Ukrainian society that were either pro-European or pro-Russian. 

     Both Podesta and Manafort were influential campaign managers associated with the Democrat and Republican parties respectively in the U.S.  Their role in Ukrainian politics was of questionable neutrality since both were deeply aligned with both U.S. political parties and could be interpreted as interference in Ukrainian internal affairs.  The issue becomes murkier because neither legally registered as foreign agents as required by U.S. law and both were caught up in the Mueller Russian Collusion investigation (Manafort went to prison and Podesta’s investigation was dropped prior to charges being filed).  The result was another potential violation of Budapest Memorandum’s stipulation that signatory parties do not engage in actions that interfere with political integrity.  This is a weak argument that did not gain traction, since U.S. political parties are private and not part of the government, Podesta and Manafort were private citizens, but with both closely aligned with both the Republican and Democrat parties it is hard to accept they were not representing U.S. political interests.

     Yanukovych’s controversy was not U.S. campaign advisors but his reversal of pursuing closer economic ties with the EU and signing a trade deal and loan assistance with Russia in November 2013.  This agreement caused protests in Ukraine, especially in pro-European Kyiv, that paralyzed the Ukrainian government.  By February 2014, Yanukovych was removed from the presidency and fled to Russia.  The running of the Ukraine was assumed by a provisional government until new elections could be held. 

     The U.S., after Yanukovych’s agreement with Russia, overtly inserted itself into Ukrainian politics to play a role in the fall of the Yanukovych’s government.  Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Victoria Nuland, was the point person in the Obama administration for regime change in Ukraine and to force Yanukovych out of office.  We know of Nuland’s role because a phone call between Nuland and the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt was leaked where Nuland discussed regime change and who should fill roles in the new post Yanukovych Ukrainian government before Yanukovych was even removed and fled to Russia. 

     The exile of Yanukovych created a leadership void in Ukraine that was exploited by Putin in February and March 2014.  The protests and removal of Yanukovych due to what was regarded as his pro-Russia policies allowed Putin to argue that the sizable pro and ethnic Russian minorities were being persecuted in Ukraine.  The results were that a pro-Russian insurrection erupted in the Donbas regions of Luhansk and Donetsk and their Russian majority rebelled against Ukraine with covert Russian assistance.

     The biggest prize of 2014 for Putin was the seizure of Crimea from Ukraine.  The Donbas region bordered Russia, so Russian covert assistance was easier to disguise as an organic rebellion but the Crimea, though an ethnic Russian majority area of Ukraine, had no land border with Russia.  So, despite the Russians disguising their role in seizing the Crimea, Russian deniability in the operation was not taken seriously.  The breach of the Budapest Memorandum could not be denied but outside of some protests and some sanctions, the security provisions of the protocols were ignored.  The Russians used military power to interfere in Ukrainian affairs, but the U.S. was aggressively using soft power to interfere in the Ukraine.

     By February2014, Ukraine had already surrendered its nuclear weapons and had returned stockpiles of highly enriched uranium to Russia, so Russia received much of what it wanted and respecting the Memorandum held no real restraint on Russia.  The Ukraine in return had lost its nuclear weapons, which could have deterred Russia, in exchange for security guarantees from Russia, U.S. and the U.K.  The U.K. and the U.S. had no way of protecting Ukraine territorial integrity and what this was seemingly obvious when the Memorandum was signed.  This flaw in the enumerated guarantees of the Memorandum were fully exploited as an unrealistic commitment at best and a bluff at worse and was exposed by the Russian actions in the Donbas and Crimea. 

     With Russia annexing the Crimea and having a foothold in the Donbas, the Ukrainian people elected Petro Poroshenko, an oligarch, as the fifth president of the Ukraine.  Poroshenko ran on a platform of Ukrainian nationalism, decommunizing the country, and decentralization of the country’s government.  He was pro-European (Nuland’s strategy and Russian seizure of territory guaranteed a pro-European president), wanted to continue the war in the Donbas against the separatists, take back the Crimea and to fight the rampant corruption. 

     Vice President Joe Biden attended Poroshenko’s inauguration since he was President Obama’s point person for the Ukraine and would take several trips to the Ukraine in that role.  U.S. and EU support was needed with the country in turmoil.  Poroshenko hoped decentralization would help ending the rebellion in the Donbas by allowing Russian ethnic areas, through local elective government, to keep their identity as Russians within a Ukrainian state.  But Poroshenko also had a desire to take back the Crimea and join NATO, so much of his agenda was going to antagonize the Russians despite the policy to appease them with his policy goals in the Donbas. 

     Poroshenko pursued peace agreements in the Donbas and eventually signed the Minsk Protocol in September 2014 between Russia, Ukraine, and the OCSE, called the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, to implement a ceasefire in Luhansk and Donetsk.  The fact that Russia was involved in the negotiations was an admission that the separatist movement was part of Russian policy in the Ukraine.  The ceasefire failed but a new agreement, Minsk II Protocol was signed in February 2015 which led to the withdraw of heavy weapons by both sides, Ukraine assuming control of the international border in exchange for additional autonomy for Luhansk and Donetsk from Kyiv.  The ceasefire was held but sporadic fighting continued and not all elements were implemented.

     By the time of the next presidential election, the Minsk Protocol and continued Russian control of the Crimea and its influence in the Donbas eliminated any pretense of Ukraine territorial and political sovereignty.  The U.S. and U.K. guarantees of security were reduced to words, and with-it prestige of both nations.  Russia was what the Ukrainians always feared but now they did not have nuclear weapons to guarantee security.  They had no choice but to continue to pursue closer alignment with the West despite its failures to keep its security promises, while trying to improve relations with Russia since no Western military alliance was possible at this time.

     Poroshenko lost his re-election bid to Volodymyr Zelensky in 2019 largely due to the Poroshenko’s unfulfilled promises, the continued issue of the Crimea and Donbas and rampant government corruption.  Zelensky ran on a platform as an anti-establishment, anti-corruption, judicial and tax reform as an outsider who promised to end the war in the Donbas and to negotiate with Putin.  Zelensky was not pro-Russian but knew he had to negotiate with his powerful neighbor that was ignoring Ukraine sovereignty.  Reaching some type of understanding with the Russians could restore stability in the country and was part of a campaign promise to incorporate both Russian and Ukrainian speaking people as part of one country. 

     Zelensky’s election win was seen as a positive development for the EU, which proceeded with establishing closer economic ties with the Ukrainian government.  This was accomplished while at the same time Zelensky pursued peace talks through the Trilateral Contact Group.  These talks were considered talks to replace the Minsk Protocols which Zelensky thought were impossible to implement so the agreement needed to be replaced to settle the conflict under his stated policy to accommodate Russian and Ukrainian speaking populations of the nation.

March to War

     Zelensky was able negotiate an agreement in principle to end the fighting in the Donbas, but it was resisted by both the Ukrainian nationalists and the Russian speaking separatists in the region.  Despite his personal intervention, the agreement failed but it did lay the groundwork for another agreement called the Normandy Format mediated by France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine to end the fighting in the Donbas.  This negotiation was the first face to face contact between Putin and Zelensky.  The result was a ceasefire that, though frequently violated, did reduce the fighting significantly, but did not permanently settle the issue in the Donbas.

    Concurrently as Zelensky pursued peace in the Donbas, he held meetings with the EU to build closer economic ties as well as meetings with NATO officials in Brussels in June 2019.  This dual track policy to pursue peace to reach an agreement with the Russians and Russian separatists and at the same time building closer ties with the EU and NATO would only antagonize the Russians, whose cooperation was needed to end the war in the Donbas.  This dual track negotiation was going to handicap permanent settlement of the Donbas separatist movement.    

     Despite the limited success of reducing fighting in the Donbas, Ukrainian negotiation strategy was likely going to fail because it only demonstrated, from the Russian perspective, that Ukraine was not serious in addressing Russian concerns.  The result was a Russian military buildup starting in April 2021 along the border of the Donbas and the Crimea.  This was followed up by more troops in December 2021 which included Russian troops deployed to Belarus which threatened Kyiv.  The Russian build up was now an actual threat to the existence of Ukraine.  This was followed up by Russian proposals that could only be seen as ultimatums in the form of security agreements that required Ukraine to never join NATO and that NATO must reduce its presence in Eastern Europe.

     NATO rejected the Russian proposal and the United States stated that any incursion of Ukraine security would be met with economic consequences.  Simultaneously, Zelensky, who accused the Russian of backing a coup attempt in November 2021, tried to downplay the threat of a Russian invasion, pleaded for the international community not to inflame the situation and asked the Ukraine population not to panic.  In January 2022 Biden stated that the U.S. and NATO would not respond to a minor Russian incursion into the Ukraine, though it was clear that a Russian invasion was imminent.  With appeasement failing, Zelensky in February 2022 warned the West at Munich Security Conference that they should not appease Russian aggression but only economic threats from the international community could be used dissuade the Russians.

     In the early hours of February 24, 2022, Zelensky, speaking in Russian for part of the address, tried to make an appeal to prevent a war and give assurances that Ukraine was not going to attack the separatists in the Donbas despite Russian accusations to the contrary.  The appeal failed and that morning the Russians announced special military operation in the Donbas would commence followed by attacks on military targets in the Ukraine and the launching of a ground invasion from the Donbas as well from Belarus toward Kyiv.  Later that day Ukraine announced general mobilization and broke off diplomatic relations with Russia.  All the agreements to guarantee Ukraine sovereignty all failed as the Russians invaded.

The court of public opinion and impact of lies and corruption.

     With the war starting, all the invested parties had to convince their constituents and the world of the righteousness of the Ukrainian cause.  The ability to successfully argue a position, especially in diplomacy, projecting trust and correctness of the cause to invested parties to whatever policy is being pursued.  Following the terms of agreements and being an honest player are critical in making both domestic and international audiences convinced of the cause and entrusting the government.  Breaking of agreements and the appearance of corruption can undermine support for the pursuit of policy.

     In regards of not breaking agreements, as stated earlier, both the Russia and the U.S. took active roles to influence the internal politics of the Ukraine despite it being specifically prohibited by the Budapest Memorandum.  Once the former Soviet weapons were out of the hands of the Ukrainians and turned over to the Russians, both the U.S. and Russians saw no need to abide by this part of the agreement. This made the agreement that guaranteed Ukrainian sovereignty nullified in essence though not expressly nullified. 

     A fallout of this disregard of Ukrainian sovereignty by Russia and the U.S. sent a clear message to states that possessed nuclear weapons or were in the process of acquiring them that they should never surrender those weapons in exchange for guarantees from the Russians or the West.  The example of Libya giving up its nuclear ambitions voluntarily did not stop them from getting attacked by the West and led to the overthrow and death of its longtime dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011.   

     North Korea developing nuclear weapons, and a stated determination to use them is another example and has kept them from being attacked.  This despite its threats to the U.S. and its regional neighbors.  The message is that nuclear weapons will protect you from attacks from potential aggressors and could serve as an enticement for a nuclear arms race in the Far East (which would also be against Chinese strategic interests).  This weakens the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty as a viable policy when threatened with aggression.  Nuclear disarmament was not a way forward for peace and security for a nation because security agreements were no guarantee that the West or the Russians would honor such agreements.

     The role of U.S. political party operatives, though not acting as representatives of the U.S., Paul Manafort and Tony Podesta meant that both major political parties were active in the Ukraine.  Both were nominally supporting the same candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, the treatment by the U.S. Department of Justice saw the charging and imprisoning of Manafort, a Trump ally, and the dropping of the investigation of Podesta, a Clinton ally, created a political division in the U.S. electorate over Ukraine policy. 

    The first impeachment of President Trump was over a call with President Zelensky that discussed the firing of former Ukrainian chief prosecutor Viktor Shokin who was investigating Burisma corruption during the President Obama administration.  A whistle blower on the National Security Council, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Vindman, accused Trump of conditioning U.S. aid for an investigation of Hunter Biden, Vice President Joe Biden’s son.  The accusation was a quid pro quo accusation for U.S. aid.  The impeachment in the House of Representatives that was voted along near party lines and acquitted by the Senate also on near party lines. 

     Joe Biden was Obama’s point man in forming policy toward the Ukraine and pushed for the firing of Viktor Shokin over allegations of corruption, by Joe Biden’s own admission, pressured the Ukraine government to fire Shokin if they wanted $1 billion of U.S. loan guarantees.  This was an example of a true quid pro quo.  Shokin was in the middle of an investigation of Burisma Holdings, a Ukrainian energy company that had hired Hunter Biden to be on their executive board despite having no experience in the energy sector. 

     The U.S. electorate is nearly evenly split in 2016 and 2020 between the two parties, so Ukraine policy became a flash point of U.S. domestic policy with Paul Manafort being convicted and Tony Podesta having his investigation dropped for nearly the same conduct.  Trump was impeached on an accusation of a quid pro quo over questions of the Burisma investigation and Biden who admitted to a quid pro quo over Burisma investigation (as well as interfering in Ukrainian internal policy). 

     Disagreements over Ukraine policy were not normal political discourse but the uneven approach to use prosecutions along party lines over Ukraine policy and turned a policy debate into another U.S. partisan party politics with strong public opinion divided along party lines.  This made support of the war another hyper political divide along party lines and not on the true national security interests of the U.S. or agreements that the U.S. made.  Self-inflicted and shortsighted politics placed over U.S. interests meant that support of the Ukraine would be hampered by U.S. domestic party politics.

Diplomatic Isolation of Russia

     The other issue affecting the court of public opinion was a U.S. election strategy that led to the isolation of Russian diplomats in both U.S. and the West.  Soviet and later Russian interference in U.S. elections was not a new strategy first pursued in 2016.  For example, Radio Moscow, as part of Soviet Union’s propaganda that was broadcast in multiple languages including English.  It was part of the Soviet’s attempt to impact Western public opinion, including efforts to impact U.S. public opinion of their own politicians. 

     The 2016 Presidential election was different, not because of Russian interference.  It was different because opposition research commissioned by Donald Trump’s political opponents in 2016, called the name the Steele Dossier, named after the primary author Christopher Steele, accused Donald Trump of Russian collusion.  The document was created between June 2016 and December 2016 and was eventually funded by Hillary Clinton’s campaign and the Democratic Party in their campaign against Donald Trump.  The Steele Dossier, among other media stories, tried to create a story that Donald Trump’s business and personal dealings with the Russians had compromised him and made him the preferred candidate of the Russians.  The Russians would secure his election and would then be able to then manipulate Trump to do their bidding under threat of exposing his Russian ties.  The accusation was that Russians interference in the 2016 election was not to sow discord but to get Donald Trump elected as a type of Manchurian Candidate.

     The assertions of the Steele Dossier through a series of investigations have either been proven unsubstantiated or false, though it was not for a lack of trying by the FBI and the later Mueller Investigation.  The Steele Dossier and Mueller Report will not be discussed but the dossier was fully used by Hillary Clinton and her acolytes.  They claimed that Donald Trump only won due to Russian interference, and it was further used after the election in a campaign to influence Electors of the Electoral College to vote against Trump and prevent him from becoming President. 

     These efforts were damaging and part of a campaign to prevent a smooth transition of power, but there was even more serious damage created over the dossier accusations.  Instead of moving on from a failed election campaign, Hillary Clinton denied her election loss and if it was not for Russian interference, she would have won in a “fair” election.  She added that Trump knowingly accepted Russian collusion and was thus an illegitimate president and had to be investigated and his presidency had to be resisted. 

     These accusations plagued the Trump presidency through the early parts of 2019 until the infamous call with President Zelensky in 2019 when he was accused of committing the quid pro quo for requesting an investigation into Hunter Biden’s activities in the Ukraine to get a congressionally approved aid package delivered.  This call eventually led to President Trump’s first impeachment, and this overshadowed the Russian collusion story that largely lost steam after the Mueller Report failed to find any evidence of collusion.  But the impeachment was a dividing line.  Ukrainian aid opposition was being framed as pro-Republican and support to Ukraine was seen as pro-Democrat.  All because of the overt attempt to shield the Biden’s activities in the Ukraine, and a lie to accuse Trump of being a Russian pawn. 

     President Obama before leaving office, in December 2016, fueled the Russian collusion story by ejecting 35 suspected Russian intelligence operatives from the U.S. for helping “hack” the U.S. election.  He also disclosed a phone call between Trump’s incoming Director of National Security Council, and fierce critic of President Obama, Michael Flynn and a call with the Russian ambassador asking him not to respond to the actions taken by the outgoing President Obama.  This call was used as proof of Trump having close relationships with the Russian government.  Flynn was later fired over this call and was later arrested for lying to the FBI. 

     The subsequent firestorm from the press and fueled by Hillary Clinton’s outrage and assertions of her lost election created situation in U.S. politics that any politician or government official that had contacts with the Russian government were suspected of supporting the Russian government and their alleged interference legitimacy at best or they were outright Trump supporters and disloyal to the U.S. at worse.  The treatment of Michael Flynn and Jeff Sessions were examples that contacts with Russian diplomats would lead to legal troubles even if such contacts were part of official government duties.   Election politics of the Steele Dossier had become the basis for post-election diplomatic isolation of Russia and resistance to President Trump.   

     The reason that Russian isolation over the dossier lie and its post-election narrative was so damaging is that Russia holds important diplomatic and military status in the world.  Russia is the largest nuclear power in the world, it is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, it is the second largest exporter of oil and is part of OPEC+ and was a member of the G8 until January 2017 (left the G7 after the fallout of its 2014 invasion of Crimea).  Back channel and informal contacts with the Russian government, that was influential international relations was needed as its cooperation was integral in world and regional politics as well as the energy trade. 

     Back-channel diplomacy was a way for both sides to communicate each other’s intentions to prevent any unintended confrontations.  Such informal contacts were used to have Attorney General Jeff Sessions recuse himself from the Russian collusion investigation, which cleared the way for the appointment of Special Counsel Robert Mueller to investigate President Trump and his campaign.  Sessions as a U.S. Senator often had contacts with Russian diplomats in his role as a Senator.  It was made known, along with Michael Flynn, that these contacts would be weaponized against a person if they supported Donald Trump.

     The full court press against President Trump and the Russian government created a situation that maintaining contacts with Russian diplomats and oligarchs (often used as back-channel ways to communicate with Putin) were immediately highlighted and viewed as suspicious and any contact with the Russia was given as proof of collusion to the Russians.  Hillary Clinton declared herself part of the “Resistance” against Trump and her and her allies kept this narrative in the news.  Clinton being the former Secretary of State and co-founder of the Clinton Global Initiative was aware of these informal contacts taking place and could expose the contacts if they spoke out against this campaign of accusing Trump and the Russians.  Fearing exposure, these pathways were curtailed or closed and created a chilling effect of diplomatic contacts.

     The Mueller Report failed to substantiate what the Democrats, their media and big tech allies and Hillary Clinton were accusing.  There was Russian collusion in the election, just as there has been in U.S. elections by the Soviet Union but the depth was no more impactful than any other point in history.  But the damage was done, for nearly three years, the Russians diplomatic contacts were severely limited, and Russia became diplomatically isolated.  All this because of a lie by Hillary Clinton because she could not accept a loss to Donald Trump.  Russian diplomatic isolation occurred as Ukraine was in upheaval, and NATO and Ukraine were discussing Ukrainian membership.  When diplomatic channels were most needed, they were limited regarding Russia.  The diplomatic isolation left Russia with little choice but to pursue a more aggressive Ukrainian stance to get Western powers to take notice of their security concerns.

The Sum is Bigger Than Its Parts

     The broad take is that the Ukrainian war has either been a long series of diplomatic missteps since 1994 that led to the current war, or it was part of a purposeful strategy by the Russians and the West to de-nuclearize Ukraine to clear the way to interfere in its territorial and political sovereignty without serious repercussions.  The latter is doubtful that a grand plan was played by both sides to lead to the war today, but it is not out of the realm of possibilities that de-nuclearizing the Ukraine would open options for both Russia and the West that would not be possible with a nuclear armed state. 

     Both sides have clearly interfered in Ukraine sovereignty, even before the 2014 military operations in Crimea and the Donbas.  The West eastward expansion of NATO to the point that the borders of NATO had moved from the inter German border to the borders of the Ukraine, which was a position that could threaten Russia.  This despite that Ukraine NATO membership could not be veiled as anything other than a mortal threat to Russia and NATO leaders knew that Russia’s security concern was to prevent another foreign invasion of its territory. 

     Russia is not blameless in that it did aggressively interfere in Ukrainian politics before 2014.  It viewed former Soviet states as being under their sphere of influence and any independent actions by these states contrary to Moscow’s wishes were viewed as and treated as hostile.  Putin’s exasperated claim that Ukraine was not even a real country showed the Russian belief that Ukraine independence was an artificial creation.  The Russification of the Ukraine in the Soviet era by having large populations of ethnic Russians only reinforced this belief.

     The Russian advantage of this argument was their proximity to the Ukraine, their economic ties, and a common history.  The Russian population, without a long period of democratic traditions did not have to be convinced the righteousness of their cause as the electorate had a predisposition to support the state.  Putin also had a strong network of oligarchs that owed their fortunes to his policies and had personal allegiance to him.  This is not to say that the Russians are morally right, or that democratic governance is bad, it is just a fact that it is easier for Putin to implement policy.  This no matter how bad the policy is for the average Russian citizen. 

     The West on the other hand, had to receive some level of public support for their policies, which take longer to achieve and more effort to sustain.  The West has a history of antipathy toward the Russians and the Soviets, so that played in their favor with swaying their populations, so some going along with post-Cold War pressure through NATO expansion against the West’s former adversary was largely supported with little convincing needed by political leaders.

     The attitude in the U.S. started to change after the 9/11/2001 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror.  The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by the U.S., NATOs most powerful member, was not a NATO operation but had some NATO support but for the most part only the U.S. and U.K. committed to fighting in both wars.  Most other NATO countries sat out the conflicts, whether rightly or wrongly, but continued to push NATO expansion that was clearly directed towards Russia, 

     The result was that the U.S. electorate was seeing no support and often open criticism of U.S. policy, while at the same time NATO was expanding and asking the U.S. to promise to come to the aid of new NATO countries, while at the same time the NATO countries (outside of the U.K.) were not going to support the U.S. in any significant combat role or even honor their financial NATO treaty commitments. 

     Russia on the other hand, least at the face of it, were sympathetic to the U.S. cause in the War on Terror and had their own terrorist issues to deal with.  This is not necessarily Russian benevolence but was also Russian self-serving to create a contrast between the support that Russia was offering versus the often-loud criticism the U.S. received from their NATO allies.  The Russian support helped create a wedge between the U.S. electorate and how it viewed NATO.

     A war weary U.S. population that was being publicly criticized by their NATO partners were also being asked to carry the burden of NATO military power while at the same time nearly all NATO countries, most of whom were pushing NATO expansion, were not contributing their agreed upon commitment of 2% of total national GDP on defense spending as agreed in 2014.  Only seven of thirty NATO countries were meeting that commitment.  President Trump was critical of NATO partners for this and appeared to question how current NATO policy served U.S. interests.  So, NATO support joined the list of the hyper partisan debate in the U.S.

     The Democrat Party’s decision to punish Donald Trump and Paul Manafort through an impeachment and a prison sentence respectively for issues dealing with Ukraine while also not pursuing charges against Hillary Clinton for mishandling of classified documents, Tony Podesta and his role in Ukraine, and Hunter Biden and Joe Biden’s roles with Burisma Holdings and later interference with Ukrainian government investigation in Burisma.  Both Ukrainian and U.S. corruption is interwoven in the conflict and has split the U.S. electorate’s support of Ukraine making it another
 partisan political issue when the invasion of occurred in February 2022. 

     These divisions have only become deeper as Joe Biden chose to use the government to go after political opponents with the most visible being Donald Trump and his supporters.  This includes adversely stiff penalties against January 6^th protestors, indicting Trump himself, while at the same time trying to protect Hunter Biden and Joe Biden’s apparent influence pedaling scheme, that is deeply but rooted in Ukraine (but not exclusively) and ignoring left wing violent protests of 2017 and 2020.

     The support of Ukraine has become a deeply ingrained part of U.S. party politics for 2022 and 2024 election cycles and means that support for Ukraine is not based on hard realities and strategies to benefit the U.S. or honor commitments but a symbol of political allegiance and opposition in a deeply divided U.S. electorate.  It is an elector that is divided to the point of being contrarian with each other’s prevailing views.  The Russians know that as well and will use it to disrupt U.S. political debate and create more chaos.  This corruption in the U.S. and the corrosive use of government power against Joe Biden’s opposition has eroded universal support by dividing the population along partisan lines and prevent any cohesive policy to help the Ukrainians in their war against Russia.

Peace Talks are Needed!  Now!

     I have absolutely no love for the Russian government, its leaders or oligarchs, but with this hopeless division in the U.S. to support the Ukraine war and the military weakness of NATO partners makes Ukrainian victory unlikely (Ukraine is demographically and economically challenged versus Russia). Peace talks have not been pursued since early in the war when an apparent outline of peace was rejected by the Ukrainians at the insistence of the Biden administration.  The fact that peace talks have not been pursued, which is contrary to typical international reaction to end conflicts quickly.  So the question is why is there no interest in pursuing peace talks of this conflict?

     The war is in its second year, the frontlines have taken an almost World War I feel to it, with little movement, and offensives by both sides being costly affairs in material and human toll so there seems little point in continuing the war.  The Russian do not currently have the capability to counter the influx of Western weapons arming the Ukrainians and the Ukrainians do not have the economic resources or population to win an outright war against the Russians, and a divided U.S. public could slow military support to the Ukrainians. 

     The conclusion is that peace talks for a lasting end to the conflict are needed while Ukraine is still in a military position on the battlefield that cannot be easily defeated by the Russians except at a tremendous cost in lives or the use of nuclear weapons.  There should be no illusion that peace talks will be easy.  Both sides will need to give up their war aims and find a compromise.  The Ukraine even with Western support is not going to recapture the Crimea and to reconquer the Donbas that is so close to the Russian border.

     The West should also be willing to accept that Vladimir Putin will remain in power.  This has always been a dubious war aim and seems to be imbedded in 2016 Democrat paranoia that Putin was the reason that Hillary Clinton was denied the presidency.  There is no indication that the overthrow of Putin will lead to Western style democracy in Russia and will most likely lead to another hardliner along Putin’s line. 

     The West and the Ukraine should also give up the idea of Ukraine becoming part of NATO because it is a red line for Russia.  However, EU membership should be something that can be offered since rebuilding the Ukraine will be needed and it is hard to see Ukraine ever trusting the Russians to provide economic aid and it would be expected that the Russian will not pay reparations.  Longer term, the Russians need to ensure that if an EU army ever comes into existence, that Ukraine membership to such an arrangement should be allowed to be vetoed by the Russians.

     The Russian’s need to accept that Ukraine is a sovereign country that is free to pursue its own destiny in the world and not being considered in the Russian sphere of influence.  The Russians need to immediately return to the February 2022 borders and be willing to negotiate the status of the Crimea and the Donbas.  Once the Russians pull back to the 2022 borders, the Ukrainians must promise that they will not shut off the water to Crimea from the North Crimean Canal (provides most of the water to Crimea and in 2014 the Ukrainians blocked the canals water from going to Crimea).

      The Ukrainians should have open navigation in the Black Sea to access the world markets without Russian interference.  This could include the demilitarization of the Black Sea and its coastlines, to ensure the Russians do not interfere in the economic activities that are important for both Russia and Ukraine.  Turkey could play a role in this since it controls access to the Black Sea. 

     The Russian and Ukrainian governments would have to provide a long-term solution to the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea and its support of the breakaway regions in the Donbas.  This will be a tricky point since the seizure by Russia was clearly illegal by international law, but the return of Crimea to the Ukraine is highly unlikely and would most likely doom any peace talks.  The Donbas regions, specifically Luhansk and Donetsk need to be returned to full Ukrainian control, but a Ukrainian internal policy of limited autonomy to these ethnic Russian regions should be granted along the lines what Zelensky had proposed pre-war during his presidential campaign. 

     The Crimea negotiations will be the hardest point of negotiations but there is no reason for the war to continue if all parties agree that they will negotiate a solution in good faith.  Perhaps Crimea could be granted a limited autonomy like what was given to Hong Kong in the 1997 negotiations when the British turned over control of Hong Kong to China but was guaranteed broad freedoms and a latitude of independence from China (which China later broke starting in 2019).  This autonomy could be recognized by both parties until a final negotiated settlement is reached. 

          Russia would be expected to negotiate no NATO membership for Ukraine, and this would be a legitimate position for the Russians, but some military assistance from the West should be allowed so that Ukraine will have the military strength to deter any future aggression.  U.N. peacekeepers in the short term could be useful, but probably not practical since the Russo-Ukraine border is so long, but perhaps on the border of the Donbas-Russian boarder.  Russia should insist that no NATO or Western aligned countries be allowed to station troops in Ukraine, but perhaps Ukraine troops could be trained and armed in the West and then returned to the Ukraine as well as participating in non-NATO maneuvers.  The idea is that security assurances made by the Russians should not prevent Ukraine’s sovereign right to self-defense. 

     These are just some ideas for what peace talks and a peace treaty could look like, but there are other nuances that were not brought up, or they could take a completely different direction.  The overall point is that the starting of peace talks is possible if both sides, including the West, want them to happen, and there is common ground for which to build upon the talks.  Not trying to pursue peace should not be an option, nor should it be delayed until after the 2024 U.S. elections. 

     The promise that was given in the Budapest Memorandum in 1994, that promised that the signatories should be the goal when the war ends, and a peace is negotiated.  We are all paying the cost of ignoring the memorandum as Russian and Western countries pursued policies to interfere in Ukraine economic and political affairs.  Maybe we should consider pursuing a peace with the Memorandum’s goals and with thousands of lives lost and sizable treasures spent and lost, all parties will remember that this was the cost of reckless post-Cold War policies and destructive domestic party politics in the U.S.