The U.S. meets with both European and Indo-Pacific allies to discuss security
The headlines that were missed this week
The ongoing headlines of the barrage of tariffs and counter tariffs have buried several headlines on the defense front between the United States and its allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. During the week, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have been overseas to shape the defense and security policy of the new administration. This effort was largely overshadowed in the headlines as the U.S. has, again, stated its commitment to European security but has also set forth on the Asian pivot to contest a bellicose China in the western Pacific. The adage that walking and chewing gum at the same time is possible in the West can be achieved.
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth was in Japan this week as he continues his tour of the western Pacific, which also included a visit to the Philippines, another key ally in the region. During the Biden administration, it was decided that the United States Forces—Japan (USFJ) command center would be upgraded from just an administrative headquarters to what is called a "joint forces headquarters," which would have operational responsibility in peacetime and in wartime.
Secretary Hegseth announced that the first phase of the upgrade will be implemented with the goal of improving interoperability between the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the USFJ by improving the ability of the USFJ to work with the newly created Japan’s Joint Operations Command (JJOC) that was created in March 2025. This new Japanese command center is meant to command all branches of the Japanese Self-Defense Force along the same lines as the U.S. Joint Force Commands, such as Central Command. The proposed change in USFJ will require an expansion of the headquarters to support more staff functionality and align closer with a Joint Force Command structure.
The Western-aligned Indo-Pacific allied countries have been active members in NATO meetings, under a NATO program called the Indo-Pacific Four, or IP4, consisting of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. These countries, especially Japan and South Korea, have been approached by Europe to produce arms and munitions to support the Ukraine War effort as well as provide other data points in the Indo-Pacific region security that could impact Europe.
As the U.S. pivots to Asia, the production capacity of the IP4 countries is considered an opportunity to ramp up defense production not only to support Europe but also for the Indo-Pacific and provide logistical support to counter China. To that end, Secretary Hegseth and Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani discussed Japanese co-production of U.S.-made missile systems. These missiles in the proposal include the AMRAAM (advanced mid-range air-to-air missile) that is used by the combat aircraft of both countries (and most NATO Europe equipped with the F-35) and the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement. Production terms of these two defense systems have already been agreed upon by the U.S. and Japan.
A new proposal has been put forth during the talks to co-produce the SM-6 (Standard Missile-6), which is a long-range ship-to-air missile used by both countries. Aegis-equipped ships and a land version are available to the U.S. Army's Typhon missile system, which currently has a battery in the Philippines.
The SM-6 and the Patriot PAC-3 both have capabilities against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. The proposal to produce the SM-6 was met by condemnation and threats from both China and North Korea as an attempt to militarize Japan. The SM-6 missile has a 250-mile (400-kilometer) range, and the increased deployment of this missile in Japan would give Japan and the U.S. a significant ability to inhibit Chinese operations in the disputed waters with Japan or against an invasion of Taiwan.
Since the SM-6 can be used with the Typhon battery, the SM-6 missiles could operate from southern Japanese islands and be within range of expected deployments of the Chinese military as well from Aegis equipped Japanese and American warships. These proposals, in conjunction with production and logistical agreements made with the Philippines during the same trip, are contributing to the expansion of defense production in the western Pacific, potentially posing a direct challenge to China.
As the swing through the Pacific started putting more specifics for the Asian pivot, there was a NATO Foreign Minister meeting in Brussels this week (April 3rd and 4th) as well that was attended by Secretary of State Marco Rubio as part of planning for the leader summit in The Hague this summer. The meeting also had a side goal to discuss “urgent security issues…” as stated in a press release from NATO headquarters. The IP4 foreign ministers, the EU High Representative to NATO, and the Ukraine foreign minister were also to meet with NATO foreign ministers on April 3rd. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that “We (NATO) will focus on strengthening collective defense…” and that it is the number one priority of NATO. The issue that was overshadowing the meeting was the anxiousness over U.S. intentions and commitment to NATO, which, despite statements last month from both Secretary Hegseth and Secretary Rubio, was something that Secretary Rubio would need to address, again.
Secretary Rubia and Secretary General Rutte held a joint press conference where Mr. Rubio again reiterated the U.S. commitment to NATO and Europe, but he also reinforced that Europe must spend more on its own defense and meet its agreed-upon obligations. This is a sentiment that Mr. Rutte has been publicly and emphatically aligned with the U.S. Mr. Rutte's role, as the new Secretary General, is often seen as one to keep the U.S. engaged in NATO, as he is seen by European NATO leaders as someone that can work effectively with President Trump. So, it would be expected he would publicly support the U.S. position and not work contrary to the U.S. position. He knows that the U.S. position cannot be ignored as it is the largest member of NATO. It is also true that increased defense spending is in the interest of NATO as an organization to maintain relevance, so Mr. Rutte also has a NATO and self interest in convincing its member countries to meet their commitments.
Mr. Rubio addressed the issue to a skeptical audience of media and NATO foreign ministers by stating truthfully that much of what is being spread as “truth” in Europe is based on “hysteria” on what could be fairly considered, by diplomatic standards, as somewhat hyperbolic statements from Washington over the continued lack of defense spending in NATO despite the 2014 2% GDP agreement. This argument to support this agreed upon policy was ignored by Europe when President Trump pushed the issue during his first term with Europe. So, it could be justified that more direct approach was needed to wake European NATO (and Canada) up though it has created a diplomatic dust storm that Mr. Rubio has to work through.
Secretary Rubio at the press conference stated, "The United States is in NATO ... The United States is as active in NATO as it has ever been,” and added as a personal message that President Trump “…is not against NATO" and that "He (President Trump) is against a NATO that does not have the capabilities that it needs to fulfill the obligations that the treaty imposes upon each and every member state."
This is a reference to the lack of spending based on the commitments that every country in NATO agreed to support. Secretary Rubio stated he wanted to leave the meeting and that there would be a pathway to reach a new 5% GDP goal for NATO. He also added that 5% is not a goal to be reached in one or two years but would have a longer, but an unspecified, ramp-up period.
Secretary General Rutte has not committed to a 5% GDP goal, and it is not a target that most NATO countries believe they could meet, but he has stated that Europe knows it must pay more and carry more of the burden for its own defense. The 5% GDP target, which would include the U.S., is largely a negotiating tool to push mainly European countries to increase spending to cover decades of neglected defense spending and depleted stocks to support Ukraine in its war against Russia.
President Trump has also made a proposal to both Russia and China that there be an across-the-board 50% cut in defense budgets. Russia is non-committal to the proposal as it engages the U.S. in Ukraine ceasefire talks, and China has outright rejected the idea out of hand. An increase to 5% of GDP would add about $1.2 trillion of additional annual defense expenditures by NATO (in 2024 dollars) and would be considered spending levels to trigger an arms race.
The proposal to push for an increase in defense spending and proposal to Russia and China to cut defense spending seem incompatible with each other. However, unless the reason was to create a contrasting situation of continuing down the current path of an expensive arms race or negotiating reduced defense expenditures with the goal to reduce international tensions and, in most cases, additional national deficit spending.
The U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies will put pressure on China, and a rearming Europe will put pressure on Russia, or at the very least, deter it from further aggression in Europe and support this goal to support defense cuts. Of course, it is unclear what the purpose of the two contrasting statements is, but ambiguity would mean that such strategies would not be telegraphed, but there can be assessments made on the statements even if they are evaluated at the minimal transactional level that there is some methodology to the contrasting policy statements. The statements should be viewed from a larger perspective than just simply narrowly evaluated opposing statements.
The meetings this week demonstrate that the U.S. is shifting its defense priorities, with the Indo-Pacific being a continuation of prior administrations goals, but with it being accelerated and with a more decisive flair. The European shift is admittedly a little more disruptive, as the European powers are put in a position of having to “pay” for their decisions to ignore defense spending targets until after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but even then, to this day, it is not unilaterally supported by a sizable minority of European countries and Canada. European leaders can blame Trump for the consumption of domestic audience messaging and to help them sleep at night that it really isn’t their fault when, in actuality, it is their fault.
Despite this, the U.S. is still stating its commitment along with its impatience with its European allies, which is contrasted by Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea, which have all, despite not having targets to meet, increased defense spending and capabilities without prompting as they react to the Chinese threat differently than how Europe reacted to the Russian threat.
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Reference:
https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4139213/defense-secretary-announces-us-forces-japans-upgrade-to-joint-force-command/
https://www.reuters.com/world/north-korea-denounces-us-japans-pledge-co-produce-missiles-hegseth-visit-2025-04-01/
https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/04/japan-proposes-co-production-of-sm-6-missiles-to-the-u-s/
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/north-korea-slams-conniving-us-missile-deal-japan-rcna199230
https://www.naval-technology.com/news/japan-hints-at-co-production-of-sm-6-missiles/?cf-view
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_234132.htm