“The West Philippine Sea Newsletter: Volume 16”
“The West Philippine Sea Newsletter: Volume 16”
“PCG sending a new ship the Sabina Shoal, leasing ships, and South Korean talks”
The activity in the West Philippine Sea has remained relatively quiet this week following the withdrawal of the BRP Teresa Magbanua from the Sabina Shoal, known as the Escoda Shoal in the Philippines. The seasonal weather in the region has reduced activities in the air and sea, reducing the likelihood of an encounter that could lead to another clash between the two nations. This does not imply an improvement in the political situation, as the Philippines and China have shifted their campaign from the sea to the diplomatic and media arenas, aiming to maintain their advantage in public relations.
The Philippine Coast Guard stated this week that they are sending a new ship to replace the BRP Teresa Magbanua in the Sabina Shoal, but they did not specify which ship that will be. The security protocol entails not naming the ship in order to prevent China from interdicting it before it reaches the Sabina Shoal. China's surveillance likely already identified the ship, but there have been no reported movements beyond the Sabina Shoal. The Philippines reported that their ship experienced a delay due to storms in the area, but they expected it to arrive soon. The Philippines also reported the detection of eight Chinese Maritime Militia ships returning to the Sabina Shoal.
Security protocols would also call for the Philippines not to state what tactics they will use to counter the expected Chinese actions against the arrival of their replacement ship in the Sabina Shoal. When it was in the shoal, up to eight People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships operating near the shoal surrounded the BRP Teresa Magbanua. Though they did not approach the Philippine ship, the threat was clear. The number of Chinese ships operating in the shoal reached seventy, including PLAN, Chinese Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia, and they were able to isolate the Philippine ship. This included ramming resupply ships that tried to reach the Teresa Magbanua, intercepting airdropped food and water supplies, and ramming the Teresa Magbanua herself.
The Chinese tactics against Teresa Magbanua worked, forcing her to retire from the shoal. How will the replacement ship do any better against the Chinese tactics? One option is a mobile presence; however, the more numerous Chinese ships' aggressive maneuvering will slow down the mobile presence, making it vulnerable to a common Chinese tactic of ramming. It will also use up fuel and reduce its time in the shoal. Another option is dropping anchor and remaining stationary, but this will lead to the ship's encirclement and the cutoff of all resupply efforts, a scenario that ultimately befell Teresa Magbanua.
The U.S. and the Philippines have discussed the possibility of the U.S. escorting Philippine resupply missions as a show of strength and raising the risk to the Chinese of acting too aggressively against a U.S. Navy or U.S. Coast Guard ship. The Philippines has not rejected the offer, but at this time prefer to explore other options with its own resources. Rotating ships is one option that the Philippines could consider. The Philippines could send in a replacement ship, packed with supplies, to stay on station in the Sabina Shoal. When its supplies run low, another ship replaces it and heads back to port.
The advantages of this Philippine tactic include the elimination of the need for resupply ships and a decrease in the frequency of ramming incidents, as fewer Philippine ships are required for operations in the Sabina Shoal. This would force the Chinese to have to push its assets to interdict Philippine replacement ships further away from the shoal and closer to the Philippine main islands to block, and possibly ram the replacement ship from reaching the shoal.
To protect the shoal from replacement ships, the arc of picket ships must expand to block all approaches to the Sabina Shoal. The further the arc extends from the shoal, the more ships or planes it requires to sustain its picket line. The Philippines could then counter by changing the frequency of replacement ships to a variable rate, forcing the Chinese to maintain a continuous pickup line and use up more of its resources. China's ability to fully seal off the Sabina Shoal without resorting to force is doubtful, and operating ships closer to the Philippine main islands and territorial water poses a significant international legal risk to China.
The Philippine Senate is debating a proposal to give the Philippines the right to lease ships from foreign countries to boost its numbers in the West Philippine Sea. This would allow the Philippines to close the numerical superiority gap that China has in the region. This would also provide the Philippines with additional resources to support the rotating presence tactic mentioned earlier, as well as increase the number of ships at sea to offset the number of ships in port that need to be repaired due to damage caused by Chinese ramming.
Ship leasing would also give the Philippines the option to maintain more of a presence in other shoals in the Exclusive Economic Zone outside of the main flashpoints of the Second Thomas Shoal and Sabina Shoal, and would require China to also stretch its resources. This does not mean that leasing will give the Philippines more resources on ships than China, but it would require China to make decisions on how it uses those resources, which is something they have not had to consider in the current environment.
The Philippines and South Korea maintain close ties with each other since the end of World War II. South Korea and the Philippines have several recent arms agreements, including for FA-50 multirole aircraft. South Korea is currently manufacturing new corvettes to equip the Philippines with anti-surface, anti-air, and anti-submarine capabilities, with the first delivery scheduled for 2025. The two are also in talks to have South Korea build submarines that the Philippines can use to operate near its territory and defend its waters. The Philippines has pursued this modernization effort in response to China's increasing aggression.
The media reported last week that South Korea and the Philippines are close to a potential Visiting Forces Agreement, or VFA, and South Korea confirmed it was a discussion topic on the diplomatic sidelines during the Stratbase ADR Institute Forum on September 20th. Previously, the governments of the Philippines and South Korea did not publicly acknowledge this, suggesting that the negotiations are progressing to a more advanced stage, becoming more difficult to conceal, and preparing for possible diplomatic reactions.
The announcement coincides with the South Korean ambassador to the Philippines, Lee Sang-Hwa, who addressed the forum on September 20th. He expressed South Korea's concern over China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea, even identifying the affected region as the West Philippine Sea. Lee Sang-Hwa, the ambassador, expressed South Korea's backing for the Philippine cause, advocating for freedom of navigation and overflight, and advocating for a rules-based international order that China is disregarding.
The Joint Forces Agreement between Japan and the Philippines in June closely aligns with the discussion of a VFA with the Philippines. The discussions also included the potential of joint exercises and patrols that would bring South Korea, Australia, the U.S., and Japan to work with the Philippine armed forces in the West Philippine Sea. South Korea and Japan, though close allies with the United States and part of the same “international rules-based order” alignment, have not had close relations with each other due to antipathy over Japanese conduct before and during World War II. This is changing as both countries start to work together and sign joint agreements as they become more alarmed by the aggressive activities of the Chinese in the Indo-Pacific, particularly their aggressiveness toward the much smaller Philippines in the West Philippine Sea. Chinese aggressive actions have transcended old wounds, bringing countries together to support the Philippines in their efforts.
Not only is the Philippines a driving force for coalition building in the Indo-Pacific, but its proximity to Taiwan has made it the focal point of Chinese aggressive behavior in the region. The Philippines' willingness to stand up for its rights and challenge China without resorting to force, along with its transparency initiative to expose China's aggressive and illegal behavior, is motivating the formation of associations, rather than alliances, as a counterweight to China. At this point, has the Philippines highlighted that China’s tactics have become counterproductive as the world reacts with more urgency to what is going on in the West Philippine Sea.
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References:
https://www.eurasiantimes.com/south-korea-the-philippines-tie/amp/
https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1233860
https://www.inquirer.net/413769/pcg-replacement-ship-for-escoda-shoal-patrol-on-the-way/