The invasion of the Russian Kursk oblast by Ukraine has yielded mixed results. The invasion established a new front in the war, encompassing the Donbas, Black Sea-Crimea, and the ongoing missile and drone war over each other's territory. As the war nears its third anniversary in February, Ukraine expects the Kursk region to remain an active front for its operations as it strives to maintain its position. The question for Ukraine is whether the Kursk operation is a long-term benefit or a hindrance.
The Ukraine armed forces launched the surprise invasion of Kursk in August 2024. We never definitively defined the invasion's reason, nor would we expect it to be solely for operational and mission security. The immediate apparent benefit was giving Ukraine a bargaining chip in any peace negotiations; it embarrassed Russian President Vladimir Putin by bringing the war to Russian soil, and the hope was that Ukraine's decision to commit its scarce manpower resources would slow down the Russian brute force momentum in the Donbas and eastern Ukraine, which was threatening Ukraine's position in its east. The operation had both benefits and risks for Ukraine.
Five months after the operation, Ukraine is still holding onto parts of Kursk but has lost 40% of the territory it initially captured. In response to the invasion, Russia did not halt its offensive in eastern Ukraine and did not redeploy the forces Ukraine had anticipated. The Russians also enlisted North Korea to deploy combat troops to the Kursk region starting in December; that was a significant escalation in the war. Ukraine has claimed to have inflicted 38,000 casualties on the Russians, and although it has not released its own casualty figures, reports from the frontlines indicate that Ukraine's frontline units are experiencing acute manpower shortages compared to when the operation began, and these shortages are continuing under the pressure of a Russian offensive to retake Kursk.
Part of the Russian operation to take back Kursk includes 12,000 North Korean soldiers who are taking part in the Russian offensive. The North Korean tactics are outdated in the best of times but absolutely ill-suited for the lessons learned by the Ukrainians and Russians in their third year of fighting. It appears that the North Koreans are using their mass infantry formation tactics with little support from Russian artillery. The Ukrainians also seem to be intentionally focusing on inflicting casualties on the North Korean troops. This is an intelligent tactic in the hope of demoralizing the Korean troops early in the conflict. As a result, South Korea estimates that North Korea has suffered 3,000 casualties, of which 300 have been killed, resulting in a casualty rate of 25% in just over a month of fighting.
There was a definite morale impact as it improved the Ukrainian morale after almost a year of nonstop Russian offensives in the east, and it impacted Russian morale as it was embarrassed in having its territory invaded for the first time since World War II and bringing the war home to Russia. Other than that result, the benefits seem less apparent. The opening of the Kursk Front has created another active front for the already stretched resources of the Ukrainian military. It did not stop the Russian offensive in the east or even relieve the pressure. Kursk didn't even serve as a significant bargaining point for the proposed peace talk formula. It was the primary catalyst for adding North Korea as an active participant in the war. We can expect the Kursk front to remain active for the remainder of the war, requiring the Ukrainian armed forces to extend their active front. Overall, the Kursk offensive created more of a deficit for Ukraine than a net benefit.
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References:
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5074507-ukraine-renews-offensive-russia/
https://www.newsweek.com/russias-entire-north-korean-force-wiped-out-april-isw-2016612
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-kursk-d297a59fb9eb7db08bd742e1dd0aa753
https://www.reuters.com/world/north-koreas-suicide-soldiers-pose-new-challenge-ukraine-war-with-russia-2025-01-14/
https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/08/kursk-raid-ukraine-wwii-battle-russia-putin-revenge?lang=en