The Hill Suggests Three Non-Negotiable Points

Ukraine should avoid these points in any peace negotiations with Russia

Photo by Vony Razom on Unsplash

The Hill online website published an article by Matthew Bondy, a senior fellow at the MacDonald-Laurier Institute, offering his perspective on the three non-negotiable items Ukraine cannot negotiate to end the war. This article was a response to the ongoing discussion about President-elect Trump's intention to make ending the Ukraine War a national priority for U.S. foreign policy. Mr. Bondy acknowledges the impending serious attempt to end the war, and he offers his opinion on what Ukraine should avoid in its pursuit of peace.

The current strategy in the negotiations is to prevent Ukraine from regaining the territory it lost to the Russian invasion, including the Crimea in 2014. In return, the negotiations will offer the Ukraine some form of security guarantees, the details of which have not yet been agreed upon but could potentially include European peacekeepers from NATO countries or NATO membership. The question is how much territory is acceptable to give up to Russia in exchange for security.

The lack of significant natural defenses in the captured territories in eastern Ukraine poses a potential issue for the Russians, who may seek territorial concessions from the Ukrainians. Mr. Bondy's concern is that the only natural defense barrier in eastern Ukraine is the Dnieper River. This would push the Russians all the way to the Ukraine capital of Kyiv and would also mean the loss of its second biggest city of Kharkiv. President Zelensky and President Trump need to reject any territorial concession of this size. President Putin's request for such a land concession is unlikely to receive serious consideration.

Mr. Bondy asserts that any agreement with the Russians must include an immediate offer of NATO membership to Ukraine. The Russians have invaded Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, all of which were not members of NATO. Mr. Bondy argues this is the only option to prevent history from repeating itself.

It is true that Ukraine has a justifiable need for security that it has recognized since at least 1994. Mr. Bondy argues that collective defense is the only way to prevent the history of Russian aggression from repeating itself and provide the security that Ukraine needs. While the conclusion that security is crucial for Ukraine is correct, Mr. Bondy tends to overlook NATO as an organization. NATO is not a monolithic organization but a group of 32 independent countries that have different priorities, and it only takes one to have a dissenting voice to stop Ukraine from joining NATO. Currently, the U.S., Germany, Hungary, and most countries like Slovakia and Turkey are also in favor of Ukraine joining NATO. The Russians, of course, will balk at the idea as well, and that could derail peace talks.

Mr. Bondy is right; we need an actual security guarantee with real "teeth," but it will require a more innovative approach than relying on the unavailability of NATO's unanimous consent. The only scenario in which this could occur is if Ukraine grants the Russians the Dnieper River line.

The third issue pertains to who bears the responsibility for the cost of rebuilding war-torn Ukraine, including its devastated energy infrastructure. The German Marshall Fund estimates that reconstruction will cost up to $500 billion. Mr. Bondy suggests that the West use the frozen Russian assets in the West to pay for the reconstruction cost.

Reconstruction of Ukraine is necessary to ensure its stability and prevent Russians from exploiting it for their own interests. The temptation to fund the reconstruction by seizing frozen Russian assets, estimated to be worth $300 billion, is strong. However, we should resist this temptation, as it may also violate European law. This was evident at this year's G7 summit, where we rejected the idea of seizing the principal of the frozen assets and only using the interest dividends, as European laws ruled anything else illegal.

Many, but not all, of the Russian assets belong to private Russian citizens who had no involvement in Russia's decision to invade Ukraine. Indeed, a significant number of Russian citizens support Putin, but if they haven't breached any laws, how can the West justify seizing their property simply for being Russian? The West is not even at war with Russia, which makes the proposition even more dubious. The West needs to find another option to address the important task of Ukraine rebuilding.

The Russian government will not pay for the reconstruction either, so the European Union will most likely play a key role. Mr. Bondy asserts that Ukraine possesses abundant natural resources, and it could be beneficial for the EU to establish a profit-sharing arrangement for the cultivation of these resources as part of a loan structure to finance the reconstruction. Alternatively, the EU could establish a profit-sharing agreement with Russia for any natural resource sales originating from the occupied Donbas in eastern Ukraine.

While Mr. Bondy's suggestions hold some truth, they also exhibit a degree of naivety regarding the practicality of non-negotiable points. While the non-negotiable points hold validity, the suggestions, except for the land concession to the Dnieper River, exhibit extreme simplicity and lack relevance to the real world. Mr. Bondy states that the “devils are in the details,” and he should have used his own conclusion prior to stating his solutions to the non-negotiable points.

The Hill - 3 Non-Negotiable Points