French President Emmanuel Macron in recent months has assumed a more aggressive and public stance regarding the Russian – Ukraine War. Though France is a supporter of Ukraine and provided some assistance against the Russian invasion it was uncharacteristically absent on the world stage regarding Ukraine. Macron was only a small public voice about the war and allowed U.S., U.K., Germany, and the Baltic countries drive the policy conversations over Ukraine. This has recently changed, and the motivation of Macron is not clear other than he is using the ongoing war as an opportunity to press for greater European unity. Is unity his purpose for the sake of Europe or does he see the war as a chance for France to become the dominate influencing power in the European Union?
The apparent policy of President Macron is not to strengthen NATO, but to strengthen Europe, and specifically the European Union. This is not to be mistaken that European Union countries to leave NATO but that the EU has a military and a presence that is of equal stature on the world stage as its economic superpower status (read European Army proposal at EU Army). This has long been advocated by France, even before Macron was president, and was once a proposal that was embraced by previous German governments and vehemently opposed by the U.K. There are several factors that make this the right time for France to press its proposals.
France has traditionally had a suspicious view over the U.S. presence and leadership in NATO. The U.S. is the most powerful member of NATO, and that means that it is also the most powerful nation in Europe though it is not a European country. This suspicious view of the U.S. by France dates all the way back to President Charles De Gaulle. De Gaulle partially withdrew France from NATO in 1966 with the belief in his personal drive and France being armed with nuclear weapons that he could meet the U.S. in international politics on equal terms.
France has 290 operational warheads that are aboard submarines or on French based nuclear capable cruise missiles. The French nuclear weapons component is independent of the NATO command structure, even when it re-entered NATO as a full member in 2009. Successive French presidents since De Gaulle have all stated that French nuclear weapons are to serve the French vital interest and would not be used for collective security.
The “vital interest” clause has been purposefully ambiguous, and the ambiguity is a proper policy for the use of nuclear deterrence. President Macron has not clarified the full meaning of French “vital interests” but has added in 2020 that France’s vital interest does have a “European dimension”. Macron needed to re-clarify his position in 2022 by stating that a nuclear attack in Ukraine, which is part of Europe, would not mean that France would respond with a nuclear attack of its own.
This week, President Macron, seems to have changed his position again, that he would like to open a discussion with European leaders of using French nuclear weapons as part of a “credible European defense” against Russia and thus French nuclear weapons can be used for collective defense and deterrence. He added that France would retain control of French nuclear weapons but that they could contribute to European defense. Macron indicates that he is willing to station French nuclear weapons outside of France including in countries that had or currently host U.S. nuclear weapons.
Macron has increased his rhetoric against Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian threats of using nuclear weapons against the West due to their ongoing support of Ukraine. Macron recently responded that France has nuclear weapons as well and it is ready to use them. Now Macron is openly discussing another initiative to use French nuclear weapons to make the EU a nuclear power as well as adding long range missile capabilities and missile defense.
Macron is apparently taking advantage of two factors to increase the status of France in the EU. France is the only nuclear power in the EU since the United Kingdom left the EU. If the EU accepts the French proposal, it will put France in a powerful position that its nuclear weapons, which it would have a monopoly in the EU and retain control of, would put France as having the final say on all matters involving nuclear use, delivery, and deterrence. The second factor is the European concern that the U.S. will leave NATO, and this would give France the opportunity within Europe to fill the vacuum of the loss of American military power. Macron is using this fear by European leaders as an attempt to insert France as the leading military power on the continent and give it influence and leadership on one of its long term goals of creating a EU army.
The French proposal does have merit because deployment and doctrine around nuclear weapons does create a deterrence effect as was experienced in the Cold War. There is value of strategic deterrence in the context of the Ukraine War because a credible nuclear threat has created a moderating effect on the conflict. If France and the EU agree to allow French nuclear weapons to serve as a European nuclear deterrent this would mean that Russia would have to re-consider escalating the war in Ukraine or against NATO would mean confronting a nuclear armed peer adversary. The Cold War logic of the balance of terror using nuclear weapons would again become a reality and could serve as a moderating influence as the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. Also, the French proposal is a European Union one, and would be independent of NATO and the U.S., so it is a deterrent that is not conditioned on NATO Article 5 requirements.
The proposal by Macron and his aggressive stance lately against Russia that includes a debate of sending European troops to Ukraine (see NATO Troops to Ukraine) appears to be an attempt by France to leverage the current landscape in Europe to elevate France’s position within Europe. The U.K. no longer in the EU means that France has the monopoly on nuclear weapons. The French decision to maintain its military and defense industry at credible levels and a relative energy independence in combination with its economic strength places it in a position that is hard to rival in Europe. Germany has a larger economy but in just about every other factor, France is in a better position to dictate military matters. However, it would have to do so before the superior military potential of Germany can become a reality.
Brexit, the Ukraine War, France’s EU nuclear monopoly and the European panic over the idea of a Donald Trump presidency has given France a unique opportunity to start initiatives that would improve the stature of France. France would be able to use its nuclear deterrence in the EU along with EU economic strength to meet De Gaulle’s goal of being on equal terms with the U.S. and Russia. It would be able to leverage its position to reshape the EU with an armed force that is commensurate with its economic power and do so under the influence of French leadership. This is not to mean that Macron’s proposal is some grand scheme of French domination, but the opportunities in that has long been the desire of promoting Gallic policies and using the potential power of the EU to get there.
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References:
https://thebulletin.org/premium/2023-07/nuclear-notebook-french-nuclear-weapons-2023/
https://www.politico.eu/article/emmanuel-macron-nuclear-weapons-europe-open-debate/